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BOOK REVIEW

Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or
Boxers? Does Richard Posner Ever Sleep?

Writing About Jurisprudence, High Culture
and the History of Intellectuals
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt

Nel Duxbury has written a quite enlightening book about
American legal thought since the Civil War.' Before uttering
even a word of the text he discloses his view of his subject with
an extraordinary gesture. The dust jacket has a full color picture on it, a rarity in academic publishing these days. Duxbury
fought with his publisher for this picture, Edward Hopper's
painting, People in the Sun, a laconic view of business-dressed
humans, more reclining than seated, on a deck or terrace facing
into the late afternoon sun. One seems to be reading something;
the others simply seem to be enjoying the warmth. The significance of the cover is not apparent until one reaches the2 introduction, entitled "Jurisprudence as Intellectual History." So, it

t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. This essay reflects concerns of mine that I have tried to express in the Afterward to AMERICAN LEGAL REAImSM
AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). Earlier I raised these concerns in different ways
in The $10,000 Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L REv. 435 (1989) and A Tasty Tidbit, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 1045 (1993). My concerns date back to arguments I first engaged in
with Bob and David over twenty years ago and that I continue with them to this day. A
not so chance remark by Dorothy focused this particular presentation of my ideas, a
presentation that Bob and Laura tried to improve. Endless discussions with Fred are
buried in the following pages. Discussions with Al and Pierre about the place of reason
in academic life have finally made me comfortable enough with that very troublesome
word to use it in print. Others who have known and tried to help with my obsession indude Guyora, Alan, Janet, Isabel, Betty, Avi, Ray, Rob, Peter and Ted. All of these individuals usually have been patient with me, for which I thank them publicly. All also
know that on this subject I cannot be reasoned with. Avi did a mitzvah.
1. NEIL DuxBuRY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
2. DuxBURy, supra note 1, at 1.
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is as if the individuals in the picture are passively receiving the
warmth to be derived from the parade of American jurisprudential thought as it unfolds over time.
I have never seen the dust jacket of Martin Jay's recent
book Downcast Eyes.3 It is an extended discussion of the decline
of what he calls "occularcentrism,"4 the privileging of sight for
acquiring, and metaphors related to sight for describing the acquisition of, knowledge of the world, as a result of sustained critique in France in the late Nineteenth and especially the Twentieth Century. Given the book's argument it would have been
odd for Jay to have insisted that his publisher place a picture on
the book's dust jacket. But, had Jay wished to make an ironic
gesture, he might have demanded reproduction of a painting of
an author in a rather dark Paris apartment writing away amid
a mess of books, coffee, cigarettes, crumbled paper, and maybe a
largely empty bottle of wine. A dust jacket for an equally fine
book, Dorothy Ross's The Origins of American Social Science,5
might have had a similar picture, though the interior would be
that of a dark university office, bookshelves bulging, a narrow
leaded glass window in the background and, of course, much
less disorder in the foreground. 6 No one else would have been
seen in either picture for, as best as one can tell from either
book, intellectual activity is a variation on the pastime of playing chess by mail.
The combined image from these real and hypothetical dust
jackets is one of ideas, generated by humans closeted in their
apartments or offices, that somehow passively warm, maybe
even illuminate, a populace. This is the understanding of the
high culture of the North Atlantic that one gets from reading
much of the best intellectual history written today. Thus, it
makes perfect sense for Duxbury to choose intellectual history
as a model for his work in jurisprudence, a somewhat neglected
branch of philosophy that by definition has no human actors except in their abstract capacity as citizens, lawyers, judges and
the like. He notes:
Ideas have histories, and jurisprudence is a much more enlightening and
engaging enterprise when it focuses on those histories. When we concern
ourselves with the history of ideas about law, we are likely to appreciate
not only how certain ideas come to be discredited, but also, equally in3. MARTIN JAY, DOwNcAsr EYEs (1993).

4. Id. at 3.
5. DOROTHY Ross, TmE ORiGINs OF AmEmCAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991).

6. I am told that the actual dust jacket sported a reproduction of Jasper Johns'
painting, Flag. I doubt whether that choice has any deep meaning.
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portantly, why they were ever considered to be significant in the first
7
place.

But is this a sensible way to represent the life of the mind
during the past 130 or so years? When one leaves the cloistered
halls of intellectual history proper and examines biographies of
participants in the high culture of the North Atlantic, one gets
an entirely different, view from the one offered by Duxbury, Jay
and Ross. No matter where one looks in the intellectual terrain-authors, poets, painters, architects, composers, philosophers, even the theoretical physicists who are apt representatives of the science that David Hollinger has taught us is an
integral part of high culture in this century--one sees people doing things other than thinking and writing. One sees them falling in love, coping with families, fighting with institutions or
colleagues, enjoying friends, teaching, moving about; in other
words they can be found living and dying. Thus, from biography
one gets an entirely different representation of what it is to be
an intellectual, to participate as a creator of high culture. Even
the most ordinary biographer of a not particularly significant individual sees the difference. Consider the way Max Dresden put
it in his biography of the Dutch physicist H.A. Kramers:
It is possible that by ignoring all mistakes, all false clues, all misdirections, an efficient, smooth presentation of a scientific field or the life of a

scientist could be given. (Most textbooks follow exactly that method.) But
it is not good history: It gives a false and misleading picture of the progress of science and it misrepresents the role of most scientists in scientific evolution. A serious biography must address the background and
motivation of an individual, his hopes, expectations, fears, ambitions, the
relation of his science to his life, his relations to his friends, peers and
relatives. But a scientist neither lives nor works in a vacuum: The status
of his science, the role of the science in the prevailing culture, the political and financial circumstances-all these will affect his science and his
scientific productivity. It is only an analysis of that complex amalgam
that can do justice to the richness, the variety and the subtlety of a life
devoted to science. 8

Substitute "poet" or "artist" or "composer" for "scientist" and
'poetry" or "painting" or "music" for "science" and one might say
the same thing about such individuals and the best biographical
practice follows Dresden's prescription. Yet, this prescription
falls by the wayside when it comes to the generic category "intellectuals," individuals just as deeply enmeshed in high culture
7. DuxBTuRY, supra note 1, at 7.
8. MAX DRESDEN, HA. KRAMERS:

BETWEEN TRADITON AND REVOLUTION xviii

(1987).
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as all of the others, indeed, individuals who, on one view, are
particularly essential to high culture for they provide the ideas,
the theories that make high culture generally understandable.
Biography recedes; "hopes, expectations, fears, ambitions" become faint, at best; "the role of the ... [intellectual] in the prevailing culture, the political and financial circumstances" are reduced to outlines; "friends, peers and relatives" disappear 9 Why
do intellectual historians persist in seeing the world this way?
This is the question that I wish to ask using, with the author's
permission, 10 Patternsof American Jurisprudenceas my starting
place.
Duxbury writes to refute what he calls "the 'pendulum
swing' vision of American jurisprudential history,"" the notion
that "first there was formalism, epitomized by the Langdellian
revolution; then came the realist revolt against formalism; after
which came the renaissance of formalism, exemplified by both
process jurisprudence and law and economics, which was in turn
superseded by Critical Legal Studies."12 Rather, Duxbury argues
that the history of American Jurisprudence is one of a "complex
patterns of ideas." 3 "Ideas-along with values, attitudes and beliefs-tend to emerge and decline, and sometimes they are revived and refined. But rarely do we see them born or die. History is not quite like that."14 This point is well taken; odd
evidence for it comes from a friend who regularly laments that
he teaches at a place where legal process jurisprudence is alive
and well, though, of course, "we all know" that it was dead by
1970. Yet, Duxbury does not follow the seeming import of his
own advice by offering a history of the waxing and waning of
9. Id
10. I exchanged a series of letters with Neil with respect to a criticism he made of
my book in a review published in 9 RATro JuRis 198 (1996). That criticism, which could

be loosely translated into, "But where are the ideas?", brought to the fore old questions
about the practice of intellectual history. At the conclusion of that exchange Neil urged
me to amplify my ideas and offered his book as a convenient target. Independently,
Howard Erlanger made that target available when he offered the chance to review Neil's
book in Law and Social Inquiry. Since a second review had repeated Neil's criticism,
James E. Herget, Book Review, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIsr. 396 (1995), confirming my impression that I had not adequately explained my understanding of the practice of intellectual
history, I accepted Howie's offer. When the result of my labors far exceeded either his or
my expectations, Howie graciously released me from my obligation to him. The Review
kindly offered the orphan a home. I thank both Neil and Howie for their timely generosity. After reading the results each may regret his gesture.
11. DuxBURy, supra note 1, at 2.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2-3.
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each of the main ideas in American jurisprudence over the past
130 years. Indeed, he simply treats the standard list of topicsformalism, realism, law, science and policy, legal process, law
and economics and Critical Legal Studies-in the standard
order.
I would not fault Duxbury for presenting the standard topics in the standard order, much as it would be interesting to see
someone try a new form of presentation-formalism or anti-formalism, if those really are plausible categories, in American jurisprudence over the past 130 years. The old topics are well demarked, though often not very clear in detail, and these
demarcations are sufficient to anchor the wonderfully rich, sensitive and sympathetic, but not uncritical chapters on legal process and law and economics that are by themselves well worth
the price of the book.
Duxbury, however, does not start with these two topics. His
opening two chapters on formalism and realism form a unit designed to demonstrate that the commonly accepted idea of a "revolt against formalism" 15 in late nineteenth-century American
intellectual life is, certainly as far a jurisprudence is concerned,
a myth. For Duxbury, the great proto-realist champions of antiformalism-most notably Oliver Wendell Holmes, but also Benjamin Cardozo, John Chipman Gray and Roscoe Pound-were on
many jurisprudential issues, resolute formalists; likewise, many
of the legal realists who followed in their footsteps seemed
equally unable to rid themselves of similar formalist
prejudices. 16 This proposition seems to me to be unexceptionable
as far as it goes. Transitional figures are transitional figures;
they look in both ways. And realism was never a completely
worked out jurisprudence. What is, however, interesting is the
way that Duxbury goes about demonstrating his proposition.
Formalism, maintains Duxbury, comes in two species. One
is the Langdellian science of law in the universities and the
other is an "entrenched faith in laissez-faire"7 in the courts.
Both are described in quite standard ways. Academic formalism
is a way of seeing law as a set of logically arranged propositions-first principles, later rules-for some exemplified in, for
others derived from, appellate cases and applied by courts in the
proper resolution of disputes. Concomitantly, legal education is
the activity of learning the proper method of so identifying the
law through the study of cases. Judicial formalism, on the other
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 11.
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hand, is a preference, derived from the writings of Darwin and
Adam Smith, for a government that interferes to a very limited
extent with the working of markets, especially markets for labor
and goods. This is a preference that its exponents were willing
to enforce through the use of the Commerce and Due Process
clauses of the Constitution.
While clear and generally correct, Duxbury's flat presentation of formalism in some measure obscures the fact that dividing formalism into two parts is a key step in his implicit argument that formalism is a way of seeing and dealing with law
that has no regular relationship to the underlying substantive
disputes that animate political life; it is not necessarily associated with conservative politics. This implicit argument should
not pass unnoticed. As Mark Twain is supposed to have said,
"History never repeats itself; but it rhymes." 8 Consider that by
some lights both legal process and law and economics are formalisms. 19 Note also that virtually everyone recognizes the con18. Quoted in Alan D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, CorporateDirectors and Institutional Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 977
(1993).
19. Exactly what we mean by "formalism" is an increasingly vexatious topic. Back
when Morton White first told us of the revolt against formalism it all seemed quite clear.
Over time it has seemed far less clear, at least to me. The problem can best be identified
by looking outside law.
Which direction is the movement from Wagner, through Strauss and Debussey, to
the early Stravinsky and finally Schnnberg? How about from Ingres, then Manet,
through Renoir and Monet, to Cezanne and on through the cubist Picasso, then the Picasso of Damoiselles D'Avignon, to Franz Klein and Jackson Pollack? Which way does
that path lead? What then of Flaubert to Henry James to James Joyce? Or try Wordsworth to Hopkins, then Pound, Yeats and Eliot, to say Auden and Spender? Or Greek
Revival architecture through Adler and Sullivan, then Wright, then Gropius, to Mies
van der Rohe and Phillip Johnson? Surely in some sense all of these lines of descent are
toward a kind of formalism from something that might be called what? "realism," surely
not!
Now there is no rule that says that all of high culture has to move in the same direction at the same time. But from this range of examples it is tolerably clear that there
is little coherence behind the concept of formalism. Around the turn of the century in art
and architecture, it might possibly be nothing more than a sobriquet for "The children
think that their parents are a bit uptight!" After World War H it may mean something
else, perhaps "disclosing or made up of basic forms," a definition that might cover those
two areas and maybe music. But poetry and the novel is another matter altogether.
My guess is that the way out of this mess is the clear identification of the opposite
of "formalism" in all of these areas, but that is by no means an easy task. Even in law,
where we have known the term for this opposite for a long time, that work is only now
beginning. Here Duxbury's effort, noted in the text below, to tie "realism" to a usage in
social science directed toward looking "realistically" at the socio-economic conditions
brought about by industrialization seems helpful. The "realistic" novels of Dreiser and
Sinclair Lewis might also be a key.
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servative political tilt to law and economics scholarship. And its
pretense toward science is starkly reminiscent of the similar
Langdellian pretense. Despite Laura Kalman's arguments to the
contrary20 and to a lesser extent Duxbury's own, the conservatism of legal process jurisprudence seems equally manifest. Support for Brown 2' by northern legal academics is hardly evidence
of leftist views in a McCarthyite America that distorted the entire political spectrum while fleeing from a red menace that,
while it was a real threat abroad, was but a modest nuisance
here, at least unless one is willing to see the sit-down strike and
Harry Bridges' longshoreman's union as a threat to the American way of life, a real stretch given the degree of worker control
in Western Europe's various capitalism's. The virtually unanimous disapproval by the legal process types of the other
landmarks of the Warren Court,-Mapp, 2 Escobedo,2 Griswold24
and Baker v. Carr25-is
better evidence of their political
orientation.
The rhyming of formalist views of law and conservative
politics, while hardly necessary, is not surprising. As Ed Purcell's wonderful, if a bit benumbing, book shows,26 formalism is
an easy way of justifying a result that is controversial, maybe
even embarrassing, when defended on substantive grounds. A
conservatism that is under attack or reacting cautiously to a
dominant liberalism will find it easier to talk in code, to deny
the politics at the root of the enterprise, if that code is a plausible formality. All of which is not to say that a liberalism never
resorts to formalism. Free speech doctrine is a notorious formalism, cleverly taken advantage of by the conservative advocates
of commercial speech, and the defense of affirmative action in
the past ten or so years has been notably formal, whether the
affected class be race or sex. Still, rhyming is an important clue
to the meaning of a jurisprudence in history, that is, in a time
and place. Duxbury's approach obscures that clue.
Once academic and judicial formalism are distinguished, it
is rather easy for Duxbury to show that the usually named realist forerunners-Holmes, Cardozo, John Chipman Gray and
20. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

22-54 (1996).

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965).
369 US. 186 (1962).

26. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY- FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDIC-

TION iN INDUSTRAL AmEmCAN 1870-1958 (1992).
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Pound-are really caught in "the jurisprudential drift from formalism to realism"27 and so formalist and realist in varying, and

varyingly explicit proportions. This accomplished, he can turn to
realism.
For Duxbury realism is not a movement, not a celebration
of uncertainty and definitely not a jurisprudence of judicial tyranny, but an "intellectual mood"2 that accompanied the recognition that "law is political."29 And what was that mood? After
sensibly dismissing the idea that realism should be seen, as it
often has been, through the famous Llewellyn-Pound debate,
Duxbury connects "realism," as a self-appended label, to the
view, gaining currency starting in the late nineteenth century,
that social science was an appropriate way of depicting contemporary reality, the reality of a newly industrialized America. 30
Thus, Duxbury argues that realism's appeal to science, not as
rational ordering as it had been for Langdell and his followers,
but as a kind of empiricism, in particular to social science empiricism, is essentially a response to both of the aforementioned
late nineteenth century formalisms.
Unfortunately, Duxbury faces a problem with his own understanding of realism as a reaction to formalism in its two
guises. While there is much that he can and does say about realism and social science, most of it is directed not at judicial formalism, if by that is meant specific doctrinal results that such
formalism brought, but rather at one aspect of academic formalism, at what might be called the political theory underlying the
justification of formalism, in particular, notions about the economic ordering of American society and the nature of judicial
decision-making. And even here he has limited resources. For
example, while psychology can be covered by Thurman Arnold
and Edward S. Robinson, all Duxbury can do to bridge to the
relevant economic literature is a nod in the direction of Llewellyn, who once wrote a review of Commons' Legal Foundationsof
Capitalism, and the work of Robert Lee Hale, admittedly relevant, but from an individual at least socially marginal to the realist group and maybe intellectually marginal to most of them.
Still, Duxbury's presentation of the actual social scientific work
done by the realists and of the work on judicial decision-making
by Frank in Law and the Modern Mind and on pragmatism and
27. DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 54.

28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 79-82.
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predictivism is sound and persuasive. 31
Once Duxbury puts science aside and attempts to link realism directly to judicial formalism-the constitutional controversies of the day-and to the rise of the regulatory state, another
difficulty appears. There is little realist writing on either topic.
32
Here Morton Horwitz's recent book might be of some help.

Though Duxbury implicitly rejects, correctly I believe, Horwitz's
identification of realism with a revolution in legal doctrine,
some of realism was played out in the doctrinal details. But this
play was in the traditional common law doctrinal categories bequeathed to the law professorate by Langdell's law school and
not in the areas of constitutional and regulatory law where, on
Duxbury's thesis, reaction should have come. And not surprisingly so, since reaction in these areas could only have come in
the mid-Thirties at a point when realism had begun to fragment
in response to age and the pull of New Deal policy-making. This
inexact fit between realism, doctrinal scholarship and judicial
formalism and the similar inexact fit between realist educational reforms, realist social science and academic formalism
complicates Duxbury's story just enough to make the reader
barely notice that the choice to see realism as a reaction to forundercuts the pattern notion that Duxbury begins
malism
with.33
31. As to the aspect of academic formalism directed toward legal education, Duxbury's discussion recognizes that realism worked to reorient rather than jettison the case
method and case books.
32. MORTON HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW (1992).

33. Were Duxbury to treat realism and formalism as inextricably bound together, as
if each were incomplete without the other, the notion of patterns of thought that he
presents might be maintained by asserting that legal process, law and economics and
Critical Legal Studies were each an equally complex mixture of formalism and realism.
For example, legal process might be said to have a formalist understanding of the capacities of governmental entities, but a realist concern with the "real world" consequences of
judicial decisions. Law and Economics might be said to combine a formalist understanding of the nature of markets with a realist concern with the "real" costs of governmental
economic programs. And Critical Legal Studies surely offered a quite formalist understanding of the structure of legal doctrine at the same time that it offered a very "real"
perception of the impact of law on America's underclasses.
I suppose that by suggesting this possibility, I am admitting that I have been reading too much about Foucault of late. Though such an approach would require a significant amount of historical falsification, as well as a firm sense of what is meant by formalism, see supra note 19, it is nevertheless intriguing. As Al Katz taught me, all
theories distribute precision and vagueness in one way or another, as if Heisenberg's uncertainty principle ruled thought, as well as atomic entities. A formalism is, I think, a
species of conceptual precision bought at the expense of detail; realism, a kind of detail
bought at the expense of conceptual vagueness.
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After a brief and, on Duxbury's understanding of American
jurisprudence as a pattern of ideas, unnecessary discussion 34
of
Lasswell and McDougal's venture into law as a policy science,
he turns to the largely post-war legal process movement.
Though this is not the first serious attempt to recover this
movement, 5 Duxbury's is notable for the distanced care, concern
and sympathy with which the movement is presented, a presentation that in many ways is the most illuminating in the book.
While for Duxbury realism is a never quite fleshed out
mood, process jurisprudence is for him an "attitude."3 6 This attitude was developed "in order to cast light on... the principal
problems in the creation and application of law"37 and at its
heart is, as the chapter title makes clear, a "faith in reason."3
Thus, process jurisprudence may be contrasted with formalism
and realism in that it "marks the beginning of American lawyers attempting to explain legal decision-making not in terms of
deductive logic or the intuitions of officials, but in terms of reason which is embedded in the fabric of the law itself."39 The key
phrase here is "embedded in the fabric of the law itself," for
logic, as in doctrinal logic, is a form of reason, as is, I would argue, intuition, even if that intuition comes from judges. And the
key usage is "law" meaning, not doctrine, for it was surely the
formalist claim that logic inhered in the fabric of law taken as
doctrine, but instead meaning "law" as the process of lawmaking.
In keeping with his notion of pattern, Duxbury notes the
antecedents of process including Ames' assertion that the point
of the case method was not to teach doctrine, but to teach the
ability to "think like a lawyer"; Robert Hutchins' emphasis on
Aristotelian concepts of reason and principle; Pound's emphasis
on the growth of the common law and on the principles revealed
as inherent in that growth; Cardozo's reliance on principle for
making decisions; the work of Gray and of John Dickinson, a
Pound student; and the early Thirties pieces by Felix Frank34. I say unnecessary because Lasswell and McDougal are only significant if seen as
a reaction to realism from the party of the left that matches the reaction from the party
of the right that is legal process jurisprudence.
35. The first is G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L REV. 279 (1973), a piece that still bears
reading. See also KAu&AN, supra note 20, at 22-54. Kalnan also does a fine job of recreating legal process in her work.
36. DuxBuRy, supra note 1, at 207.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 207.
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furter and Henry Hart that examined the business of the
United States Supreme Court with the message that the court
should not be making national policy.40
However, all of this is prelude to serious business-Lon
Fuller. Fuller's secular natural law theory "was premised on the
centrality of the moral dimension of law and on the belief that
such a moral dimension "entails the recognition that legal institutions ought to be founded upon the values of individual freedom and democracy; and [that] the recognition of these values
requires, in turn, the recognition of reason at the heart of law."41
Fuller thus places reason at the center of (common law) judicial
activity, an activity that is properly directed toward discovering
and applying principles that underlie and promote group life,
and at the center of statutory judicial activity, an activity that
is properly directed toward discovering and interpreting principles underlying legislative action. All of this follows from
Fuller's principle of institutional competence: human institutions have of their nature things that they do best. Courts best
adjudicate disputes in accordance with the (common law) principles and the legislative purposes advanced by the parties to a
dispute who assert a right to a particular outcome.
Fuller's work is at the root of all legal process thinking and
so all that follows is, in effect, a refinement of that thinking.4
Duxbury recounts all of these refinements, including the Fifties
Harvard Law Review "Forwards;" Alexander Bickel and Harry
Wellington's discovery of reasoned elaboration; Henry Hart's advocacy of reasoned elaboration; Herbert Wechsler's plea for neutral principles, a plea clearly tied to worries about the activism
40. There is a problem with reaching back this far and in this many directions at
once. Whatever may be the case with Ames, Langdell and other mid-to late Nineteenth
Century legal thinkers believed that "principle" and not rule or doctrine was the operative unit of law. While Hutchins clearly meant something different from Langdell, and
Dickinson may have too, in the years before 1930 usage was still in enough of a flux
that meaning is often obscure. Cardozo, in particular, regularly trades on the ambiguity
in the meaning of "law." And Pound's usage is anything but firm. All of which is not to
say that antecedents cannot rightly be found; only that the antecedents are themselves
transitional and so weaker than their texts standing alone might at first appear.
One significant antecedent is curiously missing from this list. The distinction between principle and policy can be found in the work of Joseph Beale, as solid a Langdellian as can be found. This example of usage only emphasizes the way in which these
antecedents are wrapped up in other ways of thinking.
41. DuxBURY,supra note 1, at 225.

42. Duxbury attempts to tie the work of the legal process scholars to the work of
Fiftes political scientists such as V.O. Key, David Truman, Robert Dahl and Daniel Bell
and Joseph Schumpeter. It is a bit of a stretch, but the resonances are interesting, evidence more of a shared concern for democracy and less of cross fertilization.
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of the bad old Thirties Supreme Court; and Bickel's emphasis on
judicial passivity when no principled basis for a decision could
be found, but only one based on policy, and so by his lights "political," considerations. The centerpiece of the discussion is, however, the legal process materials created for the course of that
name offered by Hart and Albert Sacks. Here Duxbury emphasizes the concept of the "soundness," an echo of professional or
craft norms, of a judicial decision as central to an edifice that
was filled out with distinctions between rules and standards and
principles and policies, as well as with reasoned elaboration,
purposive interpretation of statutes, the notion of the maximization of human wants imported from Pound and the expanding
social pie.
After a nod in the direction of later scholars working in the
process tradition, Jesse Choper, John Hart Ely and Ronald
Dworkin, Duxbury concludes:
If so-called realists were concerned with telling it-"law"-as it is, process jurists are concerned primarily with explaining how it ought to be.
For, regardless of how it might appear to work in reality, law, from the
process perspective, must always be understood in the light of the faith:
that is, as an institutionally autonomous activity founded in reason. 3

There is much to be said for this conclusion and in particular for two of Duxbury's observations. First, it is helpful that
Duxbury has pointed out the scraps of process theory embedded
in what are generally taken to be many different kinds of legal
theory; many scholars miss that. Second, it is important to recognize, as Duxbury has, that process scholars grappled seriously
with the real problem of deciding just what were the requirements of reason in adjudication; again, many scholars miss that.
And yet, once one shifts from Fuller and his profound disagreements with realism, to Bickel, Hart, Wechsler and Wellington,
the odor of Supreme Court politics-the Black-Douglas-MurphyRutledge block in the Forties and the Warren Court and its
Brown decision in the Fifties-wafts through the air more than
Duxbury seems willing to admit. Principle and politics may have
been far less divorced in practice than in theory."
43. DuXBURY, supra note 1, at 299.
44. It is interesting to note that, as Duxbury tells his story, just as there are two

formalisms, there are two legal processes. One would be Fuller's emphasis on reason,
elaborated in the Hart and Sacks materials; the other, Bickel, Hart, Wechsler and Wel-

lington's later emphasis on constitutional law. Fuller's legal process then might be seen
as part of a line that starts with Langdell, emphasizing logic, and continues through realism, emphasizing intuition. In contrast, Bickel, Hart, Wechsler and Wellington's legal
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A good argument can be made that a discussion of law and
economics belongs in a book on the history of American jurisprudence no more than a fish belongs on a bicycle, to steal and
mangle a phrase. In response to the normatively ambiguous
question-"How are judicial decisions made?"--formalism offers
a modestly complex answer-doctrinal logic; realism, a more
complex, though not wholly coherent, answer-intuition; and legal process, a quite complex and often nuanced answer-reason.
In contrast, law and economics answers a different question entirely-What judicial decisions should be made?"-with a truly
simplistic answer-decisions that instantiate the principles of
neo-classical micro-economics. 4 But in Duxbury, law and economics has found an intelligent, sympathetic reader, one who
can truly make the theory the best that it can be, to steal from
a quite different author, without falling into hagiography, and
so his effort deserves careful review.
Duxbury begins by disputing the often heard assertion that
law and economics is a child of realism. The two, he argues, are
distinct particularly because realism's faith was in the social sciences generally, while law and economics' faith is in but one social science methodology; it rejects the others. Moreover, most of
process might be seen as part of a line that starts with, not Langdell, who barely tolerated constitutional law in his law school, but with treatise producing-judges, such as
Thomas W. Cooley and John F. Dillon, who wrote on the constitutional limitations on
state governmental authority and so emphasized the correctness of the work of the turn
of the century Supreme Court. Next would come, as a counterpart to realism, the work
of Court critics that starts with James Bradley Thayer and includes Pound, the political
scientists Charles Grove Haines and Thomas Corwin and, of course, Felix Frankfurter,
persons marginal to Duxbury's account of realism, and rightly so. On this view the unusual thing about process jurisprudence is that it manages to unite these two strands of
thought and so signals the shift in the legal academy from a central concern with private, common law to public, constitutional law that is so evident today.
45. I see no reason to hide my utter incredulity at the large following that law and
economics has drawn in the academy. To offer its ruminations as an example of science
when theory testing is all but foreign to the activity, as is the math that is central to
most university economics departments, is more than I can bear. And a science so divorced from the world that humans inhabit as to offer its prescriptions based on a system that assumes perfect competition, ignores transaction costs and treats the distribution of economic entitlements as outside of its ken is a science much like phrenology,
unrelated to the society we know and live in. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology,
110 HARv. L. REv. 877 (1997). At least we in Critical Legal Studies admitted that,
whatever we were doing, it was not science. At times we were even willing to admit that
ours was an ideology-though only at night when too much alcohol had been consumed.
The only explanation for the growth of law and economics beyond its political content is
that it has the virtue of giving determinate solutions to normative legal questions and
that is still what counts in the legal academy. See John Henry Schlegel, Talkin' Dirty, 21
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 981 (1996); Pierre Schlag, Normative and No Where to Go, 43 STAN. L.

REV. 167 (1990).
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its focus is on the substance of decisions and not on decisionmaking as was the case with much of realism and legal process
as well. Duxbury then sets law and economics apart from the
scholarship that might be known by the same name that took
place during the first half of the Twentieth Century. This work
by individuals such as Commons, Berle and Means and
Chamberlain,
*. . was composed of little more than a mixed bag of lawyers and
economists attempting to demonstrate that, to the pressing economic
problems of the day, there existed definite legal solutions. Modern legaleconomic analysis, in contrast, is concerned primarily with demonstrating that there may exist convincing economic solutions to particular legal
problems.4

This distinction seems to me to be essentially correct. It
both explains exactly how Duxbury presents the balance of his
story and affirms the reason why I earlier questioned including
law and economics in a discussion of American jurisprudence.
Duxbury then turns to the work of Henry Simons and
Frank Knight in the economics department at Chicago in the
years immediately preceding World War II. Knight was a dominating and captivating person who came to the University with
Simons, who was one of Knight's graduate students. During a
fight over Simons' tenure, Knight managed to move his student
to the faculty of Chicago's law school. There Simons began selling his brand of laissez-faire but, at least originally, not minimalist state economics, while Knight, who was influential in securing an appointment at the university for Frederick von
Hayek, preached a gospel that emphasized the relationship between political freedom, economic choice and optimal resource
allocation. When, immediately after the war, Simons died quite
prematurely, he was replaced by another Knight student, Aaron
Director. Director, who taught the economics part of the antitrust course with Edward Levi, began to push his notion that
the market was a more efficient regulator of anti-competitive behavior than the government. In due course Levi shifted from being an anti-trust advocate to supporting Director's then unfamiliar, but soon easily understandable, notion. 47 In a real sense
from here on the advance of law and economics was smooth sailing down hill, to mix metaphors.
46. DUXBURY, supra note 1, at 417.
47. I must note here that I know from personal experience that Director was an excellent teacher.
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Though for a while there were competing schools of antitrust analysis at Harvard and Chicago, with the conversion of
Harvard's Donald Turner to the proposition that the object of
anti-trust enforcement is not the protection of competitors by attacking anti-competitive practices, but rather the maximization
of consumer welfare by efficient allocation of resources, Chicago
swept that field, a sweep belatedly memorialized by Robert
Bork's book on the subject.4 Then the question became what
other fields could neo-classical economics conquer. Central is the
work of George Stigler, who tried to close any even small opening for state regulation of the economy in Adam Smith's theory,
and Milton Friedman, an indefatigable empiricist, who posited
that if individuals did not in fact act out of rational self-interest
it was enough that they acted "as if" they were so motivated.
Reasonably quickly the Chicago economists demonstrated, to
their satisfaction at least, that less government intervention in
the economy, fewer policies directed toward the redistribution of
wealth and more private enterprise was a coherent normative
program for the economy. Soon after came Gary Becker who argued that humans were rational utility maximizers throughout
a broad spectrum of their social interactions and therefore that
economics could be used to understand such seemingly nonmarket driven behavior as marriage and crime. From there the
vista truly opened wide.
In the law that vista brought Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz to note that property rights might be seen as exchangeable goods. Then Ronald Coase, who had previously argued that the point of the business firm was to escape the
transaction costs that appear in markets, generalized his argument to show that, in the absence of transaction costs, it does
not matter where rights are placed, because the parties will
simply use the market to reach an efficient allocation of costs
should the laws placement of rights not impose such an allocation. This was quickly followed with Posner's suggestion that,
given the existence of transaction costs, rights should be assigned where the market would place them were there no transaction costs.
By this time objections to all of this Chicago style law and
economics were legion. To his credit Duxbury treats the objectors as generously as he treats the economists, though one has
the clear feeling that, if he had to choose, his heart would be
48. ROBERT H. BoM
(1978).

THE ANTI-TRusT PARADox- A POLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
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with the economists. Most of these objections had to do with the
reality of ever engaging in the analysis of a world without
transaction costs, the plausibility of setting aside the distributional consequences of economic and legal policies and the slippery nature of the concept of economic efficiency. Eventually,
Richard Posner recognized the unsatisfactory nature of the concept of economic efficiency, after being pummeled for adopting a
definition that posited that a solution was efficient if the winners in any transaction were in theory capable of compensating
the losers, even if they were not likely to do so! But, when Posner shifted to wealth maximization as the measure of the economic efficiency of any transaction, the outcry was only worse.
Instead of recounting the treatment of Critical Legal Studies that closes Duxbury's book, 49 I wish to return to where I began by noticing an absence in Duxbury's text. While Duxbury
mentions plenty of names in his book, there are almost no people, no places and no institutions described, no reasons for anyone to say what they are saying beyond a vague background of
American political and economic history-industrialization,
Lochner, the Depression, the New Deal, court-packing, World
War II, Brown, Vietnam, and Ronald Reagan.50 This fact does
not negatively distinguish Duxbury's book. The context, the living and dying, is no thicker in either Jay's 51 or Ross' 52 books,

books for whom the watchers on the dust jacket might appropriately be cafe intellectuals and faculty assembled for a meeting
of a learned society, respectively.
In contrast to this way of representing the life of the mind,
consider what one might learn were one to look at eight books
49. Duxbury's analysis is serious work, but I am still too close to the subject and
have too much invested in my own idiosyncratic understanding of CLS to be fair to his
effort. If comment is wanted, see Robert W, Gordon, American Law Through English
Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEo. L.J. 2215 (1996). In view of
Gordon's criticisms of Duxbury's discussion of CLS, I should note that I believe that
Duxbury is correct in arguing that CLS died when it lost interest in its theoretical ideas
after discovering that those ideas did not entail the desired political conclusions and so
shifted its concerns to the really very different questions of gender and race that its students, spouses, and lovers brought to its door. Those concerns are important; they were
not, however, the concerns that made CLS distinctive.
50. There is an exception-Duxbury's chapter on law and economics. All of a sudden
there appear to be humans doing things, getting into tenure trouble, holding seminars,
helping each other and the like, a sense that there was a real culture in which the relevant individuals participated. Whether this shift is just a matter of having more and
more lively source materials at hand or a single locus of action or an identification with
the individuals in question I cannot tell.
51. See supra note 3.
52. See supra note 5.
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written about other participants in the high culture of the North
Atlantic. 53 Mozart was buried in an unmarked grave outside of
Vienna because at the time this was the only way that bodies of
the residents of Vienna other than nobles could be buried under
Austrian law. Beethoven finally secured guardianship over his
deceased brother's son by effectively suborning appellate judges
through his connections to the Austrian royal family. Edouard
Manet died of tertiary syphilis, just as had his father. One of
the things that attracted Frank Lloyd Wright to his mistress
Mamah Cheney was that she had freed herself from her children by placing them with a nurse or sending them to boarding
school. She thus had more time for doing things with Wright
than did Catherine Wright who presided over the menagerie
that was the six Wright children. W, H. Auden, a confirmed homosexual, married Erica Mann, daughter of the novelist Thomas
Mann, so that she could gain a British passport and thus escape
from Nazi persecution brought about because she ran a peregrinatory anti-Nazi cabaret. Jean Genet regularly stole small
items from people who invited him into their homes well after
he had any need to sell the pilfered objects to eat and pay rent.
Werner Heisenberg belonged to a German youth movement
dedicated to revitalizing post-World War I Germany from a supposedly decadent mass society into a Third Reich. Even after he
had completed his doctorate Heisenberg regularly spent his vacations camping and hiking with the group of students from his
gymnasium who were part of the movement. Erwin Schrbdinger,
who had many serious love affairs, lived for many years in a
household that included his wife, his long-term mistress and a
child of theirs.
Now, in one sense every one of these bits of information is
nothing but pure gossip. Amusing, titillating, odd, scandalous or
just strange, they are the material of classic biography; the
equivalent of answering the question, "Did Marilyn Monroe
sleep with Jack Kennedy?" but about people who are substantially less glamorous. 54 But in another sense each bit of seeming
53. VoL:MAR BRAUNBEHRENS, MOZART IN VIENNA, 1781-1791 (Timothy Bell trans., 1st
ed. 1990); MAYNARD SOLOMON, BEETHOVEN (1977); BETH ARCHER BROMBERT, EDOUARD MANET: REBEL IN A FROCK COAT (1996); ROBERT C. TWOMBLY, FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT: AN INTERIRETIVE BIOGRAPHY (1973); RICHARD DAVENPORT-HNES, AUDEN (1995); EDMUND WHITE,
GENET: A BIOGRAPHY (1993); WALTER MOORE, SCHRODINGER: LIFE AND THOUGHT (1989);
DAVm C. CASSIDY,UNCERTAINTY: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF WERNER HEISENBERG (1992).
54. I knew one such fact about Underhill Moore when I wrote about him. After
Moore had engaged in at least one, if not more, dalliances in New Haven, Emma

Corstvet helped him patch up relations with his wife by selecting suitable gifts for Mrs.
Moore. This fact seemed to me irrelevant to understanding either Moore or his work, so
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gossip potentially contributes to our understanding of the culture that produced each of these individuals and rendered intelligible the products of their activities-writing music, painting
pictures, designing buildings, producing poems or novels, doing
theoretical physics. Each of these details both instantiates the
culture and helps to explain the ideas and objects that gain
their meaning in and from that culture. One can see this relationship by looking at oddly personal details that apparently
made a difference in the high culture that each of the eight individuals produced.
Schriadinger seems to have done his best work when in the
midst of some erotic entanglement or other, though from his biography it is hard to tell which is cause and which is effect.
Werner Heisenberg seems not to have been a particularly gifted
mathematician and so he did not recognize that his formulation
of quantum mechanics required application of matrix calculus
until Max Born, his former teacher, after reading Heisenberg's
work in draft, used matrix mechanics to fashion that work into
a systematic theory. Genet seems to have run out of novelistic
material for twenty years after he had secured enough success
to have rendered his autobiography unsuitable material for
scandalous transformation into novels. Auden seems to have left
England for New York in 1939 both to maintain a more settled
working routine and as part of his regular attempts at selfmortification; the result was the great poems of the Forties and
Fifties. Wright seems to have wandered during the twenty years
after he went off with Mamah Cheney in part because he had
run out of architectural ideas after the great breakthrough of
the prairie style home. These wanderings brought to his attention the work of Walter Gropius and Le Corbusier, echoes of
which can be seen in his work starting with the Johnson's Wax
building. Manet seems to have expressed his ambiguity about
his bourgeois Parisian upbringing by working constantly to have
his paintings accepted for the annual Salon's and simultaneously producing work that, even when accepted, by its content
guaranteed that it would be displayed where no one could view
it properly. Beethoven's struggle with his brother's widow over
the guardianship of his nephew seems to have brought this
bachelor to understand human relations in a way that allowed
his late style to disclose that far deeper set of emotions most
commentators identify. Mozart seems to have shifted from writing serenades and divertimenti to minuets and German dances
I never reported it.
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and from writing symphonies and concertos to writing operas
and chamber music because of his difficulties in securing royal
commissions; he redirected his work to bourgeois audiences and
so wrote in the forms that those audiences responded to.
At the same time these details might be seen as providing
support for understandings of the culture in which each of these
eight individuals did their work; consider the following possibilities. In the early Twentieth Century, European academic culture's apparent willingness to tolerate adultery in ways that
American academic culture did not serves as evidence of a
stronger separation of science and morals. Elegant mathematics,
while admired by the turn of the century theoretical physics
community, was less important to it than the fruitfulness of new
theoretical ideas. The transgressive nature of a novel's subject
matter was a significant aspect of critical success in post-war
France. Life in the New York City of the Forties and Fifties was
already so difficult, so fractured, that choosing to live there
could be seen as a self-inflicted wound. Architectural notoriety,
even in the age of form follows function, was significantly related to visual distinctiveness. The identification of the romantic
in Nineteenth Century music with intense emotion was not
wholly a matter of linguistic convention. The growth of a bourgeoisie in late Eighteenth Cehntury Austria provided composers
with an escape from the limits of patronage, but at the cost of
accepting a different specification of appropriate work.
Now, while these facts tell us something about individual
products of high culture as well as about the culture in which
such products were meaningful, they tell us little or nothing
about the development of quantum mechanics in the early
Twentieth Century, changes in the novel after World War II, the
lyric poetry that accompanied the New Criticism, the content of
International Style in architecture, the growth of French impressionism, the changes in sonata and symphony form brought
about by Beethoven's late works or the development of the classical style. Or do they? While all of these topics are intelligible
on their own terms, the question is how sensible are they in
such terms. What does it mean to inquire into topics such as
these if, as in the case of intellectual history as practiced by
Duxbury, Jay and Ross, to do so requires the continual abstraction of the products of human endeavor from the activities of
humans at a particular time and place, as well as the details of
the culture that makes up that particular time and place?
I cannot hope to answer this question about all of these various parts of high culture spanning half a dozen academic disciplines. Many of these parts of high culture have a literature
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that might be taken as analogous to intellectual history and
parts of each such literature are devoid of humans living and
dying as well.55 Thus, to answer this question for all of high culture would require that I evaluate these cognate literatures. I
leave that task for other, more qualified and interested scholars.
Instead, I shall attempt only to confront this question in the
more narrow realm of intellectual history. So let me rephrase
my question. Why has an entire genre of historical scholarship
grown up that largely ignores the personal and social element in
thought in a way that, on the whole, seems more difficult to do
with respect to other aspects of North Atlantic high culture?
What accounts for such a peculiar practice?
An easy way to get at just what is peculiar about the practice of much intellectual history is to recognize the odd status of
proper names in its works. What would happen to Duxbury's
story were we to scramble the names of his lawyers so that, for
example, Alex Bickel wrote "Ihe Problem of Social Cost," Richard Posner wrote the first casebook on contracts, Cristopher Columbus Langdell discovered psychology, not contracts, and so
wrote "Law and the Modern Mind" and Jerome Frank wrote
"The Least Dangerous Branch"? Would any part of the story
have to be changed? Well, modern legal education would have
started in Chicago and law and economics would have flowered
at Yale, but beyond such shifts, I think that the answer is
"Damn little." This is the free floating intellectual having floated
56
free in a new sense.
Or consider Martin Jays' book. What would happen if some
printer's devil would swap references to Jean Paul Sartre with
those to Georges Battaile and vice versa? Or in Dorothy Ross'
book if we move Albion Small to Columbia and Franklin Giddings to Chicago and trade all references to Francis Lieber and
Thorstein Veblen? Or consider Morton Horwitz's book. Is there
any reason on the text to believe that Charles Horton Cooley
could not have written "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning"? Again, the answer in each
case is "Damn little." Talk about the death of the author! The
55. See, eg., J.R.R. Christie & Fred Orton, Writing on the Text of a Life, 11 ART
HIST. 564 (1988) (discussing the plausibility of using biographical explanations to help
understand works of art). Carol Zemel pointed me to this interesting article.
56. I cannot resist offering the following. 'he names of authors or of doctrines here
have no substantial value. They indicate neither identities nor causes. It would be frivolous to think that 'Descartes,' 'Leibniz,' 'Rousseau,' 'Hegel,' etc., are names of authors, of
the authors of movements or displacements that we thus designate." JACQUES DERRIDA,
OF GRAMMATOLOGY 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1st ed. 1976). And to think,
intellectual history was really the first post-modern disciplinel
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ability to mix up names in this fashion suggests that the fabled
denouement of structuralism-the text writing itself-happened
some time ago. So attenuated have the signifiers and signifieds
become that, in principle, almost nothing would be lost by substituting other mammals for the humans.
Now, I do not want to suggest that we cannot learn anything from books such as these four. I, at least, have learned interesting and important things from each of them as well as
from their siblings and cousins. But it is truly peculiar to have a
literature about so intensely personal and human an activity as
tinking and writing treat the individual humans doing that activity as of so little consequence in their particularity. Why are
there no humans living and dying in this literature?
Whenever I ask this question in the presence of my good
friend, Fred Konefsky, he says something to the effect that intellectual historians write this way because that is the way they
were trained in graduate school. It is the world they inhabit, the
culture that they are. There is, of course, something to be said
for this explanation. Academic identities are tough things to
break out of, formed as they are in those years, first in graduate
school and then seeking tenure, when one is most vulnerable socially and economically and most open and excitable intellectually. And, I suppose that relatively new identities are harder to
break out of than old.57 Just what does this academic identity
consist of? Where did it come from?
As the story has been told to me, 58 contemporary intellectual history is a fusion of two varieties of work. The first, with
roots in the history of philosophy, is Arthur 0. Lovejoy's history
of ideas. A good understanding of what that was about can be
found in Lovejoy's essay in the first issue of the journal of the
same name. 59 It has always been assumed, Lovejoy began, that
Man's "thoughts have at all times had a good deal to do with his
behavior, his institutions, his material achievements in technology and the arts, and his fortunes."60 It was thus the causal role
57. Here I should note a comment made by John Higham, one of the organizers of
the Vmgspread conference discussed below. When he tried to secure senior scholars to
participate to the event, he met relative or absolute indifference. In contrast, "the
younger intellectual historians" responded with "unbridled enthusiasm." John Higham,
Introduction, in NEw DIRECTIONS iN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY xii-xiv (John

Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds., 1977).
58. Though there are versions of this story in many places, I can find no single
place where the story is told in detail. Dorothy Ross gave me the version of the story
that I recount. That I may have garbled what she said should not be held against her.
59. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Reflections on the History of Ideas, 1 J. HIS. IDEAS 1 (1940).
60. Id
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of ideas in history that would be the central subject matter of
the journal. But not all, only some ideas. "[I]deas derived from
philosophical systems have had a wide, and sometimes a
profound and decisive, influence upon the minds and the writings of the authors whose works ...

[historians of ideas] study.

The unfortunately low quality of histories of philosophy
would, however, make it necessary for scholars in various fields
to cooperate in producing studies for Lovejoy's new journal.
These scholars would try "[t]o know, so far as may be known,
the thoughts that have been widely held among men on matters
of common human concernment, to determine how these
thoughts have arisen, combined, interacted with, or, counteracted, one another, and how they have severally been related to
the imagination and emotions and behavior of those who have
held them ... f62
Lovejoy saw the work of his journal as holding off, on the
one side, the New Critics, oddly represented for him by C.S.
Lewis, who asserted that nothing extrinsic to a work of art was
relevant to the aesthetic experience of it, and on the other,
seeming determinists, both psychologically oriented scholars,
particularly Freudians, who emphasized the irrational sources of
thought, and scholars devoted to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, who asserted the dependency of thought on the social circumstances of its creation. To thus keep open a space for treating thought as an autonomous, but relevant topic for inquiry
seemed vital to Lovejoy in 1940, because:
.

"61

[alt no moment... in the life of the race has the pertinency of the Delphian imperative [know thyself] been more tragically apparent; for it
must now be plain to everyone that the problem of human nature is the
gravest and most fundamental of our problems, that the question which
more than any others demands answer is the question, 'What's the matter with man?' "

The second variety of work that makes up contemporary intellectual history is exemplified by Merle Curti's, The Growth of
American Thought.64 While not the first of such books by any
means, 65 Curti's approach stood in significant contrast to that of
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 8-9.
64. MERLE CuRTI, THE

GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT xi

(3d ed. 1964).

65. On the American side there was VERNON PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927). There were also two similar works of a larger scope, JAaEEs HARVEY
ROBINSON, THE MIND IN THE MAKING (1921) & JOHN HERiAN RANDALL, JR., THE MAKING
OF THE MODERN MN) (1926). Both of these works are in some ways closer to the work of
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Lovejoy. Curti purported to offer a "social history of American
thought 66 He argued that:
[tihe history of knowledge, of speculation and ideas, and of values cannot
easily be traced without reference to the institutions especially concerned
with making accretions to knowledge and thought and disseminating
these. Thus the growth in America of schools, colleges, libraries, the
press, laboratories, foundations, and research centers becomes an important condition for the growth of American thought.6

Further, recognizing that, "[t]he status of knowledge, the tissue
of thought, the cluster of values are at any particular time affected by the physical environment and economy, polity, and social arrangements," Curti tried to show how the differences between the American and European environments meant that
the Americans "adapted the European intellectual heritage their
own way" and so how "American agencies of intellectual life
came increasingly to differ from their European counterparts."6
Though Curti's approach was different from Lovejoy's, indeed it was arguably an example of that determinism that
Lovejoy was fighting off, the question that ultimately animated
Curti--"the nature of American democracy and . . . American
destiny"69 -was remarkably similar to Lovejoy's concern with
"What's the matter with man?" 70 The similarity of concern was
not, however, enough to cause Curti's enterprise to prosper.
Writing twenty years later, Curti admitted that Lovejoy's approach, "one that systematically analyzed ideas in terms of their
philosophical foundations, internal structures and interrelationships,"71 had turned out to be more popular.72 In some ways this
fact is curious. Despite all of Curti's emphasis on the social history of ideas, a reader of his text would find lots of facts about
the growth of American life and institutions and lots of names
of individual intellectuals, 3 but could still quite easily play the
Lovejoy than Curti in that they are focused on ideas of the West generally. Randall was

on the first board of editors of Lovejoy's journal.
66. CuRTI, supra note 64, at xi (reproducing the original introduction).
67. Id. at x.
68. Id. at xi.
69. Id. at xvi.
70. Lovejoy, supra note 59, at 9.
71. CuRI, supra note 64, at vii (preface to the third edition).
72. That was the way I experienced the field when in college in the early sixtiesbefore bellbottoms, when proper men's pants had, most curiously, a belt in the back. The
history of ideas was everywhere; the social history of ideas, nowhere.
73. Dorothy Ross tells me that when she was in graduate school the book was colloquially known as "the telephone book."
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game of switching around the names of thinkers that I played
earlier. Social context-things like the growth of commerce or
universities-was background; ideas were foreground; in between, connecting the two, there were no real people living and
dying.
When lamenting the failure of his approach to thrive, Curti
noted two significant developments in intellectual history. One
was within the scholarly literature-the study of ideas, not
through classic texts, but through myths and folklore, an approach that built on the classic work of Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land; the other was without--"anti-intellectualism and the
related problem of the status and role of intellectuals in American life."74 This latter concern became even more significant
when, in the mid-sixties, social history began to take off and
eclipse the real cache that intellectual history had earlier enjoyed, whether written on the Lovejoy model or the Curti model.
In addition to the resultant hand wringing in the bar at learned
society meetings, a significant conference was devoted to trying
to understand where intellectual history had gone wrong and to
map out "New Directions" for the field.
Of course, the conclusions of this conference, known as the
Wingspread Conference, for the lovely Frank Lloyd Wright
house where it was held, were, not surprisingly, reassuring.
That is the point of holding such conferences. Laurence Veysey
opined that "[I]ntellectual history ... has its own integrity. Its
own defined possibilities are every bit as distinct as those of social history."75 And, while emphasizing that intellectual history
can be a mix of "social realities," "collective mentalities" and
"formal systems of thought," the social realities seemed to be
unusually abstracted from the daily life of humans and a concern with "'the power of ideas' to control the lives and actions of
men" seemed relatively obviously lurking in the background. 76
Gordon Wood's prescription for altering the sad state of affairs in which the intellectual historians found themselves emphasized an allegiance with Curti's project.77 Woods noted that,
"[ilt is increasingly evident that without the help of the social
sciences in understanding thought and the way that it relates to
social behavior we will never be able to persuade the rest of the
profession of the significance of ideas and to keep intellectual
74. CURTI, supra note 64, at viii.
75. Laurence Veysey, Intellectual History and the New Social History, in NEW DIIECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra note 52, at 19.

76. Id. at 10, 11.
77. This was to be expected since Curti was the guest of honor at the conference.
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history in the center of things where we think it belongs." 8
"Only by rejecting the futile dichotomy of ideas or beliefs as
causes or effects of social forces can intellectual historians escape from what will always be a losing struggle with the realists
and the materialists."79 Intellectual historians were to do this by
recognizing that, "Ideas and symbols do not exist apart from
some social reality out there. They are the means by which we
perceive, understand, judge or manipulate that reality; they create it."80 Thus, Wood urged intellectual historians to recognize

that, "because ideas are important for what they do rather than
for what they are, any idea or symbol that gives meaning to behavior and does something, whatever its nature or source and
however irrational or silly it may seem in retrospect, has significance for intellectual historians."81 By looking at this wide range
of materials, Wood, like Veysey and Lovejoy before him, hoped
to establish that "ideas affect behavior."82
An important positive program for giving content to the social context of ideas that Curti had tried to emphasize was
forcefully offered by David Hollinger, who suggested that intellectual history was best understood as recreating the "discourse
of intellectuals."8 3 In turn, Thomas Bender suggested that Hollinger's discourse was best situated in specific times and places,
particularly in cities before the middle of the Nineteenth Century and in disciplines or the university thereafter.8 4 Still, Hollinger's examples made it clear that the discourse in question
was to be assumed, not proven, and that discourse might take
place between individuals who could in no sense be thought of
as having discussed anything together, since they could have
never met or corresponded, and might not even have lived at
the same time. Similarly, Bender's more narrowly drawn notion
of the site of discourse still encompassed generations of speakers
and was, like Curti's earlier work, directed more to specifying
the institutions that provided the matrix for discourse at any
given time than to recreating the actual discussions of individu78. Gordon Wood, Intellectual History and the Social Sciences, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN
ABERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra note 57, at 27.

79.
80.
soon.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 32. This recognition would come back to haunt the participants all too

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
David A. Hollinger, Historiansand the Discourseof Intellectuals, in NEw DiRECTIONS IN AmERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra note 57, at 42.
84. Thomas Bender, The Cultures of Intellectual Life: The City and the Professions,
in NEw DmETIONs IN AMERICAN INTELECTU AL HISTORY, supra note 57.
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als at that given time and place. Thus, despite the real advance
that Hollinger and Bender had made in providing an understanding of what intellectual history was about, neither seemed
to do much to minimize the ease with which the names of their
intellectuals could be swapped one for another.
In retrospect, the conference was a great success. The social
historian barbarians were held at bay for a while by acknowledging the relevance of social context a bit more and, at the
same time, a fusion of the two varieties of work-Lovejoy's and
Curti's-was formally effected. Thus, for about the next ten
years, intellectual history, more in the Curti than the Lovejoy
mold, and led generally by the participants in Wingspread and
their friends, experienced significant growth. But in the Eighties
there came a new challenge that, though echoeing Wood's recognition of the constitutive role of "ideas and symbols" and
phrased in the latest French, post-modern fashion, seemed much
like a counter-attack led by Lovejoy's ghost.
Soon after the Wingspread conference, a similar conference,
this time entitled "ihe Future of Intellectual History," was held
at Cornell. Here, the key question was asked by Martin Jay in a
paper entitled, "Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic
Turn?", an echo of the title of a book of essays edited by Richard
Rorty. The answer to that question was obvious from the title.
The general proposition offered by the participants at the conference was derived from the work of Ricoeur, Gadamer, Derrida
and Foucault. They asserted that there was, in Derrida's words,
"nothing outside the text,"86 and that therefore the job of the
historian was not to search for authorial intent, wtch was beyond the text and hence unknowable, but to interrogate the text
through strategies of structural analysis and deconstruction, to
examine texts standing alone. The point of this strategy for doing intellectual history was not to give up on the possibility of
knowing a text, but "to gain access to the metalinguistic and
metahistorical patterns of social intercourse and conflict... by
suppressing or bypassing the (thinking, writing) subject, including the voice of authorial will."87
Not surprisingly the advocates of this approach were, at
least initially, modern European intellectual historians, the indi85. THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

(Richard Rorty ed.,

1967).
86. DERMIDA, supra note 56, at 158.

87. Donald R. Kelley, Horizons of Intellectual History: Retrospect, Circumspect, Prospect, 48 J. HIsr. IDEAS 143, 159 (1987).

Winter 1997]

THE HISTORY OF INTELLECTUALS

303

viduals who were most directly exposed to these ideas. 88 With a
little bit of imagination this return of focus to great texts could
be seen as an attempt to reinvigorate the history of ideas after
the devolution of Lovejoy's broad, interdisciplinary vision into an
activity that "cut channels rather narrower and less venturesome" than those he had mapped out.8 9 Nor did it escape notice

that "the primary aim" of the favored methods of textual interpretation was "to shift the control over meaning from the original author to the theoretically better equipped interpreter," and
that "the acquisition of such critical license (and authorial
power)" was likely to "appeal to aspiring young intellectual historians."90 Likewise, it was reasonably obvious that the vocation
of the historical scholar was being augmented with a "more general vocation as cultural critic,"91 though whether this augmentation was a good idea was a text left uninterrogated.
While there were significant differences in the approaches
of the various Cornell conferees, adopting either version of their
semiological theory, whether the one that holds that language
shapes experienced reality or the more thorough going one that
holds that language constitutes experienced reality, seemed to
undermine the more social history of ideas that the Wingspread
conferees wished to follow, for either made problematic the relationship of text to context. The inevitable fight over these two
approaches to intellectual history was focused by David Harlan.
For Harlan, "recent developments in literary criticism and the
philosophy of language" had "undermined belief in a stable and
determinable past, denied the possibility of recovering authorial
intention and challenged the plausibility of historical representation," with the result that situating texts in their context was
"undoable."92 He contrasted the contextualist program centered
around discourse, one that he admitted was "the dominant and.
. .conventional orthodoxy," to the textualist program of the
modern European historians. 93 For him the problems with defining the relevant network of discourse and with coping with the
recognition that context was but another text to be interpreted
88. And so their conference proceedings came out as MODERN EuROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: REAPPRAISALS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES (Dominick LaCapra & Stephen L.

Kaplan eds., 1982).
89. Kelley, supra note 87, at 151.
90. Id. at 159.
91. John E. Toews, Intellectual History After the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of
Meaning and the Irreducibilityof Experience, 92 Am HIST. REV.879, 899-900 (1987).
92. David Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, 94 AM. HIST.
REv. 581 (1989).
93. Id. at 594.
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were insuperable and thus only compounded the undesirable
"tendency [of discourse-oriented historians] to reduce complex
works to the status of documents." 94 For Harlan, when "discourse-oriented historians look at a particular text, they want to
know how it functioned within a specific discourse.""5 Therefore,
"their primary interest" was seen to lie "in the- context rather
than the text" and their "[i]nterest in the text" was accordingly
"purely instrumental" and so objectionable because "complex
texts" were "systematically diminished" by being "aplroached as
something other than themselves." 96 In contrast, Harlan wished
to suggest that, "rather than... groping backward toward some
unreachable genesis," intellectual historians should encourage
an approach that would "abandon the attempt to recover authorial intention" and so work toward "resituating" historical texts
so that they "point forward, to the hidden possibilities of the
present."97 Thus, "a space might be cleared" within which a history could be written "concerned not with dead authors but with
living books, ...

not with reconstructing the past but with pro-

viding the critical medium in which valuable works from the
past might survive their past-might
survive their past in order
98
to tell us about our present."
David Hollinger's response to this attack on the contextualist program was remarkably restrained. He emphasized the implausibility of "dismissing . . . the entire project of studying

ideas in their historical context" on the basis of "purely philosophical ideas" without examining the project's "monographic results."99 And he argued that it was important "to enrich readings
of particular texts" as well as "to illuminate a larger discourse
in which ... [complex texts] may have a part."100 Nor was he
against Harlan's wish to use such texts to illuminate the present. For Hollinger, work of this kind with complex texts was
"ubiquitous" in the academy:
"[c]ontextuaism went beyond... [such works] but without closing them
off The project of studying ideas in their historical context tried to liberate us, to whatever degree possible, from the constraints of the present.
One major value of contextualism was the expansion of our perspectives
94. Id. at 595.
95. Id. at 595-96.
96. Id. at 596.
97. Id. at 604.
98. Id. at 609.
99. David A. Hollinger, The Return of the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical
Knowing, 94 Am Hisr. Rsv. 610, 614 (1989).

100. Id. at 617.
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Harlan's reply is of less importance than Hollinger's rather
meek concession that he believed the way was open for many
approaches to doing intellectual history. This concession may
have been a recognition that, whatever intellectual historians
may have said in public about the continuing vibrancy of their
discipline, it nevertheless still was true that, as one of their
number recently admitted, intellectual historians "have lost au10 2
thority in relation to the dominant forms of social history."
Nonetheless, however insecure some or all of the participants in
this dispute were about their place in the academic universe, a
matter about which I will have something to say later, that insecurity still should not have blinded everyone involved to a
simple linguistic phenomenon.
In a world of paired concepts-text/context, authorial intent/
interpreter meaning, language as autonomous/language as referential, etc.-each dependent for its meaning on the other, the
denial of one of these concepts is not the equivalent of affirming
that the other owns the field, but rather implies either that a
different dichotomous structure of words is necessary to understand what is being talked about or that some other, single concept is similarly appropriate. 10 3 This is the double helix of language (and thus law), 0 4 paired words, each part of a chain of
similar words, each chain gently but endlessly circling around
the other, connected by the tension of opposition, but never
touching; the loss of any word in one chain making its paired
opposite useless in its separate chain, floating alone, intelligible
only intransitively, reduced to being an entity knowable only
mystically----"OM."
An excellent example could be constructed from Hollinger's
helpful distinction between The Knower and the Artificer.10 5 Hollinger distinguished literary, and some streams of philosophical,
modernism both of which emphasized "making," the world of the
artificer, from "cognitivism," encompassing scientific and other
attempts to know experience and various streams of philosophi101. Id. at 618.
102. Fritz K. Ringer, The Intellectual Field,Intellectual History and the Sociology of
Knowledge, in THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 106, 107
(Peter Karsten et al. eds., 1992).
103. The same holds true of assertions of the identity of the two elements of a dichotomy. To assert "law is politics" is of necessity to assert "politics is law," or better, it
is to assert some third thing, for example that law and politics are "chicken soup!"
104. I have stolen this concept from Fred Konefsky.

105. David Hollinger, The Knower and the Artificer, 39 An Q. 37 (1987).
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cal modernism both of which emphasized "finding," the world of
the knower.105 He then tried to show that these two attitudes
10 7
subsisted side by side across Virginia Woolf's great divide,
even though the former emphasized strategies for generation of
meaning and the latter, those of reference to meaning. But, if
Hollinger's distinction is sensible, and I think that it is, to deny
the plausibility of "knowing," as Harlan and the modern european intellectual historians seemed to do, was simultaneously to
deny the plausibility of seeing the world in terms of "making" as
well, for knowing is only intelligible in terms of its difference
from making and vice versa. On its own philosophical terms the
textualist challenge was empty.
No sooner had Harlan been dealt with than there came Peter Novick's book, That Noble Dream.08 This enormous study,
relying heavily on his examination of the private papers, as well
as the published writings, of over one hundred years of American historians, tried to chronicle the ups and downs of the idea
of historical objectivity, the ability of historical study to disclose
"truth" about the past. Novick's conclusions were bound to raise
hackles in the profession, for he argued that objectivity was a
myth that was adhered to seldom, if ever; that political, and
hence not objective, criteria always had been evident in the
writing of history by Americans and so, that the concept of objectivity could easily be dispensed with; and that history as a
discipline had fragmented to such an extent that there was no
discipline left, no agreed on topic that one might be objective
about in any sense less trivial than not lying about the existence and content of documents. Still, that the young intellectual historians, the backbone of the Wingspread conference, by
no means a particular target of Novick's, should take up the
cudgels against the book was a bit of a surprise.
First came a long review by James T. Kloppenberg in which
he faulted Novick's book for the "intellectual history of the objectivity question that it does not provide," an absence that meant
that the book did "not advance our understanding of the substantive issues concerning the question of objectivity itself." 0 9
106. Id. at 40-43.
107. Virginia Woolf, Character in Fiction, reprinted in 3 THE ESSAYS OF VIRGINm
WOOLF 421 (Andrew McNellie ed. 1988) (noting that "on or about December 1910 human
character changed.").
108. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM- THE OBJECTvm QUESTION AND THE AMERI.
CAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
109. James T. Kloppenberg, Objectivity and Historicisms:A Century of American

Historical Writing, 94 Am.HIST. REv. 1011, 1015 (1989) (reviewing PETER Novimc,

THAT

NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTVrrY QUESTION" AND THE AmRICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION
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What occasioned this observation was Novick's concluding chapter in which he looked at post-modem challenges to the notion
of objectivity and noticed that there were few new ideas from
the defenders of realist epistemology that were out there meeting the post-modem challenge. Kloppenberg asserted that such
a conclusion, which he took to offer "a bleak assessment of history's prospects," was unwarranted because Novick had failed to
examine more carefully the work of William James and John
Dewey "who placed their confidence in free-floating communities
of inquiry" whose results would "provide us with hypotheses,
provisional syntheses, imaginative but warranted interpretations, which then provide the basis for continuing inquiry and
experimentation."'10 This was an "hermeneutics" that would
bring history "[b]eyond the noble dream of scientific objectivity
and the nightmare of complete relativism" and onto the "terrain
of pragmatic truth.""' This approach to history, "present in the
best work of American historians since the first decade of the
twentieth century," Kloppenberg labeled "pragmatic hermeneutics."1 2 For him such an approach to historical understanding

was supported by the recognition that "[olur convictions can be
rooted in conventions rather than Truth and still have important consequences" and that the relevant convention was one
that "acknowledges both the indispensability of the scientific
method of verifying facts and the equally indispensable hermeneutic method
of interpreting the meanings of the past we seek
3
to explain.""
Next came Thomas L. Haskell, noted by Kloppenberg as one
of the expositors of pragmatic hermeneutics, who objected
strongly to Novick's identification of objectivity with political
neutrality. Haskell believed in the importance of political commitment and found such commitment consistent with objectivity
because for him objectivity was "the expression in intellectual
affairs of the ascetic dimension of life."1 4 That dimension was
said to enable historians "to do such things as abandon wishful
thinking, assimilate bad news, discard pleasing interpretations
that cannot pass elementary tests of evidence and logic, and
most important of all, suspend or bracket one's own perception
(1988)).
110. Id. at 1026, 1030.
111. Id. at 1030.
112. Id. at 1018.
113. Id. at 1027, 1029.
114. Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practicein Peter
Novick's That Noble Dream, 29 HiSr. & TnEORy 129, 131-32 (1990) (book review).
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long enough to enter sympathetically into the alien and possibly
repugnant perspectives of rival thinkers,"1 5 in a word to exercise "detachment." 116 Without detachment and the other
"characterological values" associated with "the intellectual vocation," members of a scholarly community who were "unwilling to
put intellectual values ahead of political ones" would "erase the
only possible boundary between politically committed scholarship and propaganda and thereby rob the community of its principle justification for existence 11 7
Thereafter came David Hollinger, noted as the other of the
expositors of pragmatic hermeneutics, who, at an American Historical Association forum, praised Novick's book as a work of intellectual history, though he found it "more usefully considered
as a social and political history of the profession." 1 8 For Hollinger, Novick's claim that, in Hollinger's words, "the ideal of objectivity, even in its most hermeneutically self conscious formulations, has been decisively refuted and what is needed is simply
the Nietzschean courage to face the relativistic abyss" was a
"misleading" understanding of the "current historiographical situation.""1 9 And he contrasted Novick's practice, which was "attentive in the extreme to the standard professional norms," with
his theory, which was that "the concept of objectivity was 'essen-

tially confused.'

"12

Novick's response to these criticisms-I did not lament the
current state of historical scholarship but think it is quite
healthy; I wrote a traditional book because I thought that such
would be most persuasive to historians-was notable for his assertion that he did not believe that the critics disagreed about
his answer to the "objectivity question." Instead, he asserted
that they disagreed with the nature of that question which the
critics took to be methodological and he took to be ontological.
"It goes not to the.., issue of how we do our work, but to who
we are, what we're doing and what we've done when we've done
it."'2 ' Whether he was right in this assessment is not clear, but
it does seem significant that Dorothy Ross, in an extraordinarily
trenchant commentary on the entire debate, found it "strange if
115. Id. at 132.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 151.
118. David A. Hollinger, Postmodernist Theory and Wissenschaftliche Practice, 96
AM. HIsr. Rav. 688 (1991).
119. Id. at 690.
120. Id. at 691.
121. Peter Novick, My Correct Views on Everything, 96 AmER. HIST. REv. 699, 700
(1991).
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the 'historical sensibilities' of historians, as well as the way they
'frame their narrative or analysis,'" their practice as it were,
"were not affected" should the perspectivalist
critique of objectiv22
ity, their theory as it were, be true.
Thereafter, Kloppenberg continued to advocate the pragmatic hermeneutics that he found in the work of Haskell and
Hollinger, though with an increasing rhetorical pitch. Ultimately he tied his vision of pragmatism to Democracy, opined
that "the community of historians is a paradigmatic example of
a pragmatic community of inquiry" and linked such a community to the working out of democratic values. For Kloppenberg
the debate over objectivism and relativism was important since
"[i]t is crucial that we historians be able to distinguish what
happened from what did not, and what was written from what
was not, and our discursive community must test its propositions in the widest range of public forums," for without such an
ability "we engage in shadow play, unable to distinguish experience from illusion."m
That he and the other intellectual historians again failed to
recognize that, as was the case with Hollinger's debate with
Harlan, the demise of "objectivity" would not bring about the ascendancy of its opposite, be that "politics" or "propaganda" or
"subjectivity," but, as Novick intimated, the demise of both, is
less important than noticing the great stakes that were asserted
to be at issue in an argument that Novick did not address to the
intellectual historians in particular, but to the profession in general. Novick's attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of objectivity surely was as threatening to the political and social historians, if not more so. Yet, somehow for the intellectual
historians the fate of the profession (and maybe even democracy) was tied up in the question of whether or not there was
some way to recognize that humans work in situated spaces and
at the same time to establish some mechanism or process
whereby the results of historical inquiry could represent more
than simply the fruits of one's perspective from that situated
space.
While contemplating the question of why scholars such as
Harlan so quickly attempted to pull intellectual history back
from so small a nod in the direction of greater emphasis on context, or why anyone felt it necessary to build a methodological
122. Dorothy Ross, Afterword, 96 AM. HIsT. REv. 704, 707 (1991). It is, of course,
possible that one will never miss what one never had.
123. James T. Kloppenberg, Pragmatism:An Old Name for Some New Ways of
Thinking?, 83 J. An HIST. 100, 136, 138 (1996).
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shelter from the "death" of objectivity, it makes sense to look at
something absent from the Wingspread conference, and noticed
as such by one of the organizers-biography. John Higham remarked that a generation before "intellectual history flourished
in partnership with biography," but that at the conference there
had been displayed "a skepticism about the importance of individuals in history," 24 this though two of the participants had recently published fine examples of the biographical genre.2 5 The
reason for this skepticism was the fact that the emphasis in social history on social aggregates of class and caste, when combined with the related emphasis on studying, not the materials
of high culture, but rather the less exalted beliefs of such social
aggregates, their mentalities, as the Annales school of French
historians called them, made the work of individual thinkers of
limited (causal?) importance and even raised the hoary specter
of determinism. But aside from this narrow, time bound concern, despite whatever Higham said, biography has always had
a difficult relationship with intellectual history. Biography had
absolutely no place in Lovejoy's history of ideas. And, as my rendition of gossipy details about the lives of my eight participants
in the high culture of the North Atlantic was designed to show,
biography's place in Curti's world, one that had more in common
with the social historians than anyone at Wingspread seemed
willing to admit, 126 is not all that obvious. Thus, the hybrid
form, intellectual biography, might be seen as the tentative fusion of political biography, the ancient source of much political
history, though now largely devolved to stars of Hollywood, TV
and popular music, and intellectual history.
Still, whatever its origin, intellectual biography, the biography of intellectuals with the gossip taken out, is no mule. It is a
vital form. Two recent examples merit note and simultaneously
124. John Higham, Introduction, in NEw DmECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL I-sTORY, supra note 57, at xi, xvii.
125. DAVID A. HOLuNGER Momus IR COHEN AND THE ScimNTmc IDEAL (1975); DOROTHY Ross, G. STANLEY HALL THE PSYCHOLOGISr AS PROPHET (1972).
126. In retrospect, the rise of social history was less evidence of a weakness in intellectual history, as it seems to have been taken by the Wingspread conferees, than a recognition of both the leftward lurch of the academy in the Sixties and the opening of positions in history to women and minorities in those same years. The rest of the noise was
fad-quantitative methods-and fancy-Annales history. Th;e best evidence for this interpretation seems to me to be squarely within intellectual history itsel: In 1968 historians
knew as little about the lives of intellectuals (or bankers, for that matter) as they did
about homemakers and bootmakers. Were social history really about social aggregates of
any kind, intellectuals (and bankers) would have been just as good objects for study. Indeed, they would have been much more attractive objects for study, since they left more
easily accessible written records.
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can focus on the oddity of the hybrid. Robert B. Westbrook's
John Dewey and American Democracy127 patiently examines
Dewey's early years for an understanding of the way that his
early Hegelianism turned into his later pragmatics and provides
a much needed focus on Dewey's continuing concern with democracy, a concern that survived, indeed increased, after the famous dispute with Randolph Bourne over the American entry
into the First World War. Yet, there is a real sense in the book
that, after Dewey is married and firmly settled into an academic
position, his actual surroundings are not very important to the
story, this though, as Bender points out, the university was well
on its way to becoming the center of intellectual life by the time
Dewey began teaching at Chicago and though both Chicago and
Columbia, not to mention The New School for Social Research,
were quite distinct intellectual enclaves. Now, it may be that
Dewey was in fact less tied to his universities than to the reform communities around him in both Chicago and New York.
On Westbrook's text one could make that argument. But the
concreteness of either situs for Dewey's life is simply not there.
His ideas constantly float free of his moorings. James Miller's
The Passionof Michel Foucault'2 presents a thinker whose work
is much more difficult than Dewey's. Not surprisingly Miller devotes a remarkable amount of space simply to making sense of
texts. To my way of thinking he succeeds in this endeavor about
as well as can be expected. What is more remarkable is how
well Miller succeeds in making apparent the concrete circumstances that accompanied the writing of several of Foucault's
major texts. In addition, in Miller's work there is a strong sense
of time and place, of the more general situation that surrounded
Foucault both in the university and in left political culture.
Though there is no sense of the daily activities of Foucault, episodically his activities come clear. People actually sit down to
have conversations. Lovers come and go. Paris is gray; California is sunny and bright. Arcane political maneuvers are made
sensible and in particular the politics of the French university
system and of academics involved in national politics are made
tolerably comprehensible. But the most amazing thing about the
book is Miller's success in linking Foucault's participation in
sado-masochistic sexual practices and his delight in the gay
bathhouse scene in San Francisco, a scene that contrasted so
markedly with that of his own Paris, to both Foucault's death
127. ROBERT B. WESTROOK JOHN DEWEY AND AMmcAN DEMOCRACY (1991).
128. JAMEs Maim, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT (1993).
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from AIDS and to his philosophical emphasis on the "limitexperience." 9
While Miller's work is, I think, better than Westbrook's because of the sense of concreteness to Foucault's life that is lacking in Dewey's, still, there is something peculiar about both
books. It is the sense of the Viennese torte to even these, among
the best of intellectual biographies, of layers of life and writing,
life and writing, life and writing... assembled like cake then
butter cream, cake then butter cream, cake then butter cream..
• . Such is the formal manifestation of the disjuncture between
life and work. 130
Now, of course, there is always the possibility that, had the
Viennese torte form been pointed out to Westbrook or Miller,
each would have asserted that there was a significant disjuncture between the life and writings of their respective subjects.
But, it is the failure of both authors to address the question of
the relationship of daily life to thinking and writing that is most
significant. Even for Miller, it seems that if Foucault's activities
do not directly illuminate his writings, then they can be
skimped on. In this genre, works may, as in the case of Foucault, illuminate difficult parts of a thinker's life and may even
act in a kind of symbiosis with that life, but it is still a life of
the mind that is written, not a life that simultaneously, and
perhaps on a daily basis, has trouble with landlords, department chairs or publishers or with lovers, friends or children.
Even in this hybrid form, the assumptions that make up the
disciplinary norm somehow shine through: Ideas on their own
terms are causative agents in history. This central norm underlies intellectual history and can be traced all the way back to
Lovejoy.
All this having been said at length about where a particular
academic identity comes from and what it consists of, Konefsky's
proposition, "Stop this nonsense, Schlegel. Just accept that intel129. I strongly prefer Miller's work to DAVID MACEY, THE LIVEs OF MICHEL Fou.
CAULT. A BIOGRAPHY (1993). While Macey's work gives a far more detailed, though remarkably gossip-free, presentation of Foucault's life and in general gives brief, clear
presentations of his work, it is a pelting downpour of names, places, activities, political
and academic factions and the like. Little attempt is made to disclose pattern and almost none to the explanation of social practices and institutions. This criticism ought to

make reasonably clear a point that is often missed by my readers. While I am attempting to identify an absence in intellectual history, that absence cannot be addressed simply by multiplying detail as Macey has done.
130. I found the same problem when trying to lay out the early work of Walter
Wheeler Cook and Underhill Moore; it was perhaps even more obvious then because the
available biographical material was so much more sparse.
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lectual historians write this way because it is the way that they
were taught. It is who they are," is, I think, unsatisfactory.
Granted disciplinary structures are strong and academics are
sheep. In any endeavor there always is the push of the party
line, of patron and discipline. Still, the "why" question remains,
"Why does practice in the discipline continue in this particular
way?" What is there about the identity of the scholars in the
discipline, of those who live it, that makes that identity, that
definition of what is "proper work," so tenacious?
After all, disciplines do change. Geniuses appear. Mozart altered forever the way opera was conceived. Beethoven surely
changed the way that the sonata was thought about. Manet may
have made the decisive break from French academic painting.
Wright liberated home design in ways that are still being felt.
Auden and Genet made far less of an impact on literature, but
Eliot and Joyce surely made up for the difference in an earlier
generation. Heisenberg and Schr6dinger simply transformed the
way physics is thought about. Doubtless, neither Dewey nor
Foucault will be spoken of in the same tones as Plato and Kant
by our grandchildren, but, with some work in the next several
generations, the former may be seen to have given us a better
way to understand the relationship between knowledge and democracy and the latter, to have helped us to see the way that
patterns of thought limit our thinking. What is it, other than
the pull of normal science, that places Hollinger and Bender's
emphasis on looking at discourse in a concrete context at the
border of thinking about their discipline and not at the core, or
even the trailing edge? If some graduate advisor at, say,
Harvard, Yale, Hopkins or Berkeley said to the new crop of
graduate students in intellectual history, "Before you write a
word you need to know everything about the lives of each of the
major characters whose work you will explore on any topic you
decide to write on!" though trumpets might sound, no walls
would fall.
One conceivable explanation for contemporary practice in
intellectual history, one answer to the "why" question, would
center on relevance, a question of the fit of any text with a suggested context.' 31 It might be argued, following Hollinger and
Bender's emphasis on disciplinary communities, that the context
most relevant and helpful to understanding the products of intellection is the normal science in the discipline or area in which
131. Robert Gordon suggested this argument to me.

314

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

a text can most comfortably be situated. 132 As a precept directing research this assertion of relevance might be reduced to,
"First look at the bends and twists and turns in the field for an
understanding of what any piece of work in it might mean. It is
most likely to fit well in that context." But relevance is an empirical concept. In this context it asks, "What evidence might illuminate the text in question?" The assertion that other texts in
the field best illuminate a particular text may be true in any
given case, or even in a class of cases. But to establish that factual proposition at least one would have to give evidence of having examined other possible sources of illumination, that is unless the assertion works like an evidentiary presumption, either
by rendering evidence to the contrary irrelevant and so conclusively determining the fact or by requiring that opponents first
produce evidence to counter the assumption before the proponent may be asked to defend it. If it is the former kind of presumption, then relevance is clearly not an issue; the presumption is simply a disciplinary norm that is unquestionable, a
preference for where and how to work and we are back to
Konefsky's observation. If it is the latter kind of presumption,
then it needs to be supported by some evidence that repeated
evaluation of contexts other than the disciplinary matrix has
produced limited results. But it is that evidence that is lacking
in intellectual history as commonly practiced. Venturing far and
wide over living and dying in an attempt to illuminate texts and
the cultures in which they are found is just what is absent from
current practice. Thus, I rather doubt that relevance is what
drives that practice.
Another possible explanation for the current practice in intellectual history, of which Duxbury's book is but an example,
can be captured by considering the notion that Dorothy Ross
suggested to me-all of the subject matters I have talked about
132. This is essentially the argument made by Quentin Skinner. See MEANING AND
CONTXT: QUENTiN SKNNER AND His CRmCS (James Tulle ed., 1988). His argument that
texts are only intelligible when situated in such an historical context has brought down
on him the wrath of political theorists whose discipline often functions by commenting
on classic texts used for their formal relevance to the contemporary problem being dis-

cussed. This is, of course, an argument about nothing. There is no reason why a text
cannot be read in any number of ways, for any number of purposes. Recovery of meaning
at a time past is only one of those possibilities and doing so hardly impugns the activity
of creating political theory if it is useful for it to proceed in some other way.
At the same time it should be noted that it is surprising how often I read work that
is presented as a comment on past ideas or about present ideas about the past that on
reflection seems more accurately to be described as social, political or cultural theory in

disguise.
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are parts of North Atlantic high culture. Why would one treat
participants in such diverse, yet similar enterprises so differently? The first and most obvious difference is in the medium in
which production of high culture takes place. Music and art
have limited, and in most cases no, verbal content; that is the
reason for the awful, metaphoric language that is used when
they are discussed. Literature has for some reason been taken
as also offering up its meaning with difficulty, a fact that may
explain why of late literary criticism is as thickly impenetrable
as are art -and music criticism. Modern physics is mathematics,
a language that is anything but verbal. In contrast, the intellectual, as well as whomever is the speaker of the content of any of
the mentalities that one might study, works only with words.
And words, as we all know, are transparent. They need no context to make their meaning clear as do art and music, literature
and physics.
But, of course, the assertion of transparency is quite odd.
On one side, much of intellectual history is taken up with the
explication of complicated texts; in such circumstances, any assertion of transparency would also silently suggest that much of
that explication is light lifting, an avoidance of the hard work
done by scholars working to explicate the products of other
parts of high culture. On the other side, on the textualist theory
of meaning, only language can make language "clear," if clear is
the right word, since all meaning is created by the relationships
between words. Thus, a reference to facts "external" to the
text-biography, history, politics economics, etc.-only complicates understanding for it just adds texts to the existing stew
and those texts too need understanding. On such a view, of
course, it is the practices in other fields that are troubling, not
the practices in intellectual history. But as a justification for
current practice, this argument from the post-modern view of
language is a bit post hoc for a discipline that was engaging in
these practices a good while before the relevant theory ever surfaced and parts of which are fighting post-modernism tooth and
nail.
A more historical defense of present practices in intellectual
history would be the adoption of a textualist-like position, but
based on a purported tie to the "New Critics" in American literature who likewise radically limited the material for explaining
literature to the work itself. More plausible, that is, except for
the fact that it is precisely this view of literature that Lovejoy
objected to at a time when the New Critics were in their ascendancy, and the practice of Lovejoy and his disciples is surely the
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most acontextual of all the branches of intellectual history.133
More importantly, after thirty years of literary criticism and
Wittgensteinian philosophy the assertion that language is transparent is preposterous. And, I have a hard time believing that
intellectual historians as a group are unaware of the challenges
to the notion of the transparency of language made during these
same thirty years. Of all historians, intellectual historians seem
most to have read and pondered these theories and, at least at
the verbal level, to have internalized them. Thus, however easy
it may be to ascribe the usual practices for treating texts in intellectual history to a notion about the transparency of language, I think that such an explanation is likely to be wrong.
An alternative explanation, an alternative "why," offered by
some of my feminist friends seems more promising. A contextualized ratiocination is male; richly contextualized understandings are female. It's back to Jake and Amy. I do think there is
some explanatory force to this criticism, especially given the distribution of female historians between social and intellectual
history. But, at the same time, I do not wish to do more than
mention the point, and not particularly because it has the personally odd result of fracturing sex and gender for both Dorothy
Ross and myself. While gendered understandings may have had
something to do with early practice, this is not the important
question. Just as is the case with the transparency of language,
I find it hard to believe that intellectual historians as a class
are unaware that their practices could be described as having a
gendered basis. Only an hermetically sealed academic would not
have made the connection, at least briefly. No, again, what
seems to be more important is the persistence of practices over
time, the sense that criticism based on gendered norms is somehow irrelevant to what is driving current disciplinary practice.
I suppose that explanations other than training, transparency and gender are possible as well. For example, the personal demands of scholarship may play a part. Although one
ought never to discount the young historians macho,134 the redemptive power of "With No. 2 pencil and Xerox machine
through darkest Archives," at the same time one should remember that it is easier to exercise a practice that allows one to take
133. It should be noted that of late has come a movement in literary studies that
purports to resituate works of literature in their historical context. See JEREMY HAW.
THORNE, CUNNING PASSAGES: NEW HISTORICISM, CULTURAL MATERIALISM AND MARXISM IN
THE CONTEMPORARY LIfERARY DEBATE (1996); NEW HISTORICAL LITERARY STUDY: ESSAYS ON

REPRODUCING TEXTS, REPRESENTING HISTORY (Jeffrey N. Cox et al. eds., 1993).
134. Laura Kalman acquainted me with this delightful concept.
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all ones research materials home to the quiet of ones study than
to have to slog away with ones research under the dubious eye
of some suspicious archivist who works only normal business
hours or worse, to spend ones evenings in unattractive motels in
the pursuit of interviewees who have had the bad judgment not
to locate themselves all in one place, and that redemption might
come from wresting with a large pile of dusty, obscure Seventeenth Century political tracts. Moreover, there is a hidden advantage occasioned by the usual practice once it is recognized
that sociologists and anthropologists are remarkably loathe to go
back into the field a second time; instead they tend to my field
notes for a longer time than is probably sensible. One is seldom
too old to take out a few books from the library and try to make
sense of them. Thus the disciplnlary norm may be reinforced by
the comfortable pattern of work that it permits.
While all of these explanations for current practice in intellectual history have some force, still, I think that it is possible
to identify an even more satisfactory explanation of that practice by asking the question, "Where is the hero in most intellectual history?" "Hero?" comes the reply. "There is no hero. Intellectual history is neither a narrative enterprise nor a piece of
traditional fiction!" Here, at the most preposterous assertion of
all, I must beg to differ. While it is true that the hero in intellectual history is absent, is nowhere to be found, his, and I use
that word carefully, absence is as powerfully felt as the absent
mother upstairs in Long Days Journey into Night, the Godot
who never comes or Kilroy who always was, but never is, here.
The absent hero is the intellectual as a type and derivatively,
the university intellectual. And so, the implicit assertion of the
causal efficacy of thought standing alone, of reason, the formal
product of intellection, of intellectuals, is the social justification
for the activities of the species of academics of which the creators of these works of intellectual history are exemplars.
Consider. When was the last time that you read a book or
article in the field where the exercise of reason was portrayed as
a bad thing? Of course, from time to time reason may yield
false, even pernicious results and intellectual historians do not
fail to examine such occurrences. Indeed, it might be that an exhaustive evaluation of the relevant literature of the past ten
years would show that intellectual historians prefer to examine
circumstances where reason has not lived up to its demonstrative potential. But that is just the point. Who points out the failures of reason? Either an intellectual or an intellectual historian! And you say that there is no hero.

318

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

I think that it is no mere coincidence that recognizable
forms of the discipline first appear in the Twenties and grow in
number in the Forties and Fifties. By the Twenties, the modern
university was about filly formed and the ascent of the sciences
to their place of dominance in the university was visible, if only
through the example of the drive toward a more rigorous empiricism in the social sciences, areas that had previously been more
fully the province of reason and not counting. By the Forties and
Fifties the social sciences were lost ground and even worse, it
was arguable that reason's dark night had brought the twin
evils of fascism and communism, the horror of the former only
then sinking into our consciousness, the horror of the latter,
whipped up where it was not already apparent. Ideas had consequences as even the blind could see.
That ideas had consequences was, of course, their saving
grace, at least for a group that, perhaps it is not to strong to
say, felt itself under attack on the one side from the growth of
science and on the other by the growth of that antiintellectualism in American life that Curti felt it necessary to
remark on, not to mention the continuing insecurity that, despite Lovejoy's strong assertion that ideas were a causal force in
history, he just might not be right. After all, Lovejoy's assertion
was made in response to various determinisms, Marxist or not,
that seemed to deny the causative efficacy of ideas. But here, of
course, the important point was that to suggest determinism
was to deny the importance of the intellectual as a type. Why
else care?
Intellectual historians care about the causative force of
ideas in history for the same reason that other groups care
when their activities are attacked. Thus, when the Philistine's
in Congress attacked the NEA, the artists came back, not just
with cries of censorship, but also with assertions of the importance of art for the culture of all Americans. Similarly, when
music instruction in the public schools is threatened with termination, the music world in any little or big community comes
out in force with the assertions about the importance of music
in American life. And, when the Superconducting Supercollider
was threatened, the particle physicists came out en masse. Responses such these are at least as much a recognition of the
presence of a threat to the sense of the significance of what
these individuals do, to their feeling of worth, as they are a recognition of a threat to these individuals' pocket books. To cut
back on the NEA or on music or on big physics is to suggest
that these disciplines are not very important to life in America,
that it is no big deal to be an artist, a musician or a physicist.
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And to suggest that ideas lack causative force in history, that
texts can never be situated in their historical context, that objectivity is a snare and a delusion, is to suggest that it is not
very important to be an intellectual historian and derivatively,
an intellectual. Such a conclusion truly opens a Nietzschian
abyss.
So, all of those now seemingly pointless references to causality, carried down as late as Thomas Haskell's concern about
the determinist implications of social history for intellectual history expressed at the Wingspread Conference, 135 all of the strife
during the Eighties over textualism and contextualism, all the
concern with objectivity were not all that pointless. Intellectual
history, "the history of what intellectuals have said about issues
that historians regard as important,"136 establishes the importance of what we as intellectuals, and in my experience intellectual historians are intellectuals par excellence, do each day and
so our place in the world as intellectuals was at stake. Novick
was thus both right in his assessment of his disagreement with
his opponents and wrong. He was right that the issue was ontological, about what it is to be both an intellectual historian and
an intellectual. But he was wrong in not understanding that it
is very hard to face such ontological issues directly and so that
to pose the issue as a methodological one was more tractable,
less threatening, more capable of generating an acceptable middie way out of ones problems such as "pragmatics hermeneutics," less likely to cause a crisis in a field that, justifiably or
not, already felt itself to be vulnerable.
Reflect for a moment on Thomas Bender's assertion that he
writes to document the public role of the intellectual in American life.137 I do not doubt him for a minute. Kloppenberg's concern to establish a method that would assure that "our conventions can... still have important consequences" and Haskell's
worry that abandoning objectivity would "rob the community of
[intellectuals] of its principle justification for existence," as well
as Kloppenberg's later attempt to tie "the community of historians" to the "pragmatic community of inquiry" that he took to be
135. Thomas Haskell, DeterministImplication of Intellectual History, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra note 57, at 132.

136. David Hollinger, What is IntellectualHistory?, 35 HisT. TODAY, Oct. 1985, at 49.
137. See Thomas Bender, Academic Knowledge and PoliticalDemocracy in the Age
of the University, in INTELLECT AND PUBLIC LIFE 127 (1983). See also The Cultures of Intellectual Life: The City and the Professions, supra, at 3. The result of Bender's desire is
NEw YORK INTELLECT, A HISTORY OF bINTECTUAL LIFE IN NEW YORK CrrY, FROM 1750 To
THE BEGINNINGS OF OUR OwN TimE (1987).
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at the root of democratic values, are similarly evidence of attempts to shore up the public role of the intellectual. 13 Nonetheless, the implicit assertion that such a public role continues to
exist is quite dumbfounding. Whatever may be the case in
France, a matter that I am still not convinced about, all of
Bender's research patiently, indeed lovingly, chronicles the
death of those institutions that supported the public culture of
the intellectual. Every reading club that died, every little magazine that folded, every journal of opinion that is no longer with
us, every newspaper that has turned closer to the tabloid form
is just further evidence that the life of the mind in America has
withdrawn into the academy and there, all but pulled up the
drawbridges. Notice the reaction made inside the castle when a
Carl Sagan or a Stephen Jay Gould, an Alan Dershowitz or a
Lawrence Tribe seems to participate in public life. How quickly
come the negative words-mere popularizer, filthy lucre. The insecurity behind such often deserved appellations is palpable.
As historians, we ought to expect that this would be the reaction of intellectuals to the shift from a dominant elite to a
dominant popular culture, one of the unforeseen "consequences"
of our celebration of democracy. Surely, the notion that the
promise of Emilie will be fulfilled on any great scale is no longer
plausible. But predicting the decline of the relative social importance of one's caste is not the same thing as accepting the decline of ones craft. The presence of the absent hero protests the
decline of the former quite eloquently, but it also points to the
existence of an insecurity brought by the latter-the insecurity
of professional role.
I suppose that someone outside of an history department
can be forgiven for mentioning that the most peculiar aspect of
the historiography of intellectual history is the obvious professional insecurity squirreled away in all of its corners. Lovejoy
and Curti showed no such insecurity at the start, but by the
time of the Wingspread conference it was there for any careful
reader to see. John Higham directly acknowledged a "loss of momentum" in intellectual history;13 9 Laurence Veysey, who emphasized the separate "integrity" of the field14° and Gordon Wood
who emphasized the need to keep intellectual history "in the
center of things," instead buried their worries in their affirmations.141 Kloppenberg's concern to present a "moderate histori138. Kloppenberg, supra note 109, at 1027; Haskell, supra note 114, at 151.
139. Higham, supra note 124, at xiii.

140. Veysey, supra note 75, at 19.
141. Wood, supra note 78, at 31-32.
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cism 142 seems similarly calculated to put a good face on a tough
situation, while Haskell's claim that the resolution of the objectivity question entails "cultural ramifications" that are "incalculably wide" 143 more obviously expresses perceived peril. The
sense of a field under siege can likewise be found in such comments such as, "[t]he tides of psychological and sociological reductionism seem to have been dammed and turned back. The
history of meaning has successfully asserted the reality and autonomy of its object. At the same time, however, a new form of
reductionism has become evident, . . . "-144 and "[i]f, as I Believe,
the clarification of belief systems . . . is the true task of the

human and social sciences, then a certain kind of intellectual
history continues to have a place in our discipline."1 45 Though
the project of the Cornell conferees was offered in strident tones,
those tones would have been unnecessary had there not been
the underlying sense that the program they offered was necessary for the field to remain viable; even David Harlan seemed to
be pleading for some space in which to be left alone when he
suggested that "context-oriented historians should stop chastising their colleagues for 'presentism' and acknowledge the
value-if not the necessity-of letting the present interrogate
the past."1' For all of these individuals there seemed to be a
real risk that the products of Paris apartments and American
college offices would not warm Duxbury's people but rather
would be cast out onto a rocky, desolate, darkling plain.
While David Hollinger may be right when he asserts "intellectual history's unique vulnerability to ... epistemological cri-

still the genesis of all of this professional angst is not all
that obvious. As Hollinger made clear to Harlan, by rights, the
social (and political) historians should suffer from the same
epistemological problems as were asserted to plague the intellectual historians; they don't seem to be worried. Good books of intellectual history get published and I assume that graduate students still appear at the doors of well placed mentors. Thus, the
sis,"147

142. Kloppenberg, supra note 109, at 1029.
143. Haskell, supra note 114, at 142.

144. John E. Toews, Intellectual History After the Linguistic Thrn: The Autonomy of
Meaning and the Irreducibilityof Experience, 92 AM. HIST. REv. 886, 906 (1987).
145. Fritz K Ringer, The Intellectual Field,Intellectual History and the Sociology of
Knowledge, in THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISrORY 106, 113

(Peter Kersten et aL.eds., 1992).

145. David Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, 94 AM. HIm.
REV. 581, 608 (1989).
147. David Hollinger, The Return of the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical
Knowing, 94 An HIsT. REv. 610, 611 (1989).

322

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

special vulnerability of the field seems to me to hide more than
a little worry about the plausibility of the enterprise quite apart
from its relative decline in cache.
It should not be forgotten that intellectual history was hottest in the decades dominated by the fabled "end of ideology"
and Parsonian sociology. The presentation of ideas favored in
the field, the ability to scramble proper names and yet keep the
argumentative thread, is at least homologous with the abstracted understanding of political and social life dominant at
that time. Today, when in contrast no detail of human or social
life can be safely walled off from the intrusive glare of "meaning," it is much harder to hide the hero of intellectual history
than once was the case when all of social life was hidden too.
Still, to try to hide the hero may be a quite plausible strategy
for a group that on one hand is threatened with a reduction of
the importance of its work to matters of time, class, caste, and
gender, and on the other, with a Faustian bargain that preserves the autonomous place of thought, but at the price of radically reducing human agency, except possibly at the point when
paradigms or epistimes inexplicably shift. Better that the hero
be hidden in this time when the ethical interrogation of all aspects of an intellectual's life is acceptable scholarly behavior, for
were he not hidden, someone might discover that, as Paul Johnson's amusing book'48 seems to be trying to tell us, important
thinking can be done by less than savory people. With such
knowledge someone might then question why anyone would care
what such less than admirable persons had to say.
Thus, I do not wish these remarks to be read as saying that
hiding the hero of intellectual history is an unreservedly bad
thing. It may be a plausible strategy for allowing the life of the
mind to survive in hard times. At worst, it is an almost amusing
example of self-effacement and in this "in your face" society,
more of such examples would be welcome. Still, by effacing the
hero, by suppressing the details of the activity of thinking and
writing that intellectual historians must know from their own
lives is an intensely, particularistically personal one, they set up
an unrealistic, indeed bizarre, standard for us to meet when it
comes to living the life of an intellectual in these same hard
times. To champion, as most of us do, the decline, though maybe
that word is no longer correct, of hereditary wealth, of the rentier class, and the democratization of life for at least a middle
class of some proportions in the face of a greatly expanded and
148. bmixcTuALs (1988).
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expanding population unfortunately entails a continuing
bureaucratization of life. And it did not start yesterday. It began
over one hundred years ago with the growth of the university as
it swelled to accommodate the children of the expanding middle
class. It is time that intellectual historians recognize this shift
and so begin to explain in some detail the social conditions
under which the work of its heroes was done, lest we forget that
Locke never signed time sheets and that Henry Adams accepted
employment only when he wanted to.149
The free floating intellectual of the Nineteenth Century
whose existence was subsidized by investments in someone
else's labor or by rental payments and whose clubs and proper
journals provided an outlet for his thought is dead. 150 The minister who could contribute to the discussion of the place of grace
in God's plan for salvation is gone. The University teacher who
kept his few upper class boys in line and taught them some
greek and latin while working on another, more important topic
has disappeared.
In their place have come many types. There is the willing
captive of the ideological think tank, a recreation of the court
philosopher of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. The
free floating intellectual makes ends meet by doing editing or
waiting tables or working in a deadeningly awful, largely clerical position in some gross organization or other. The minister
has women's group on Tuesday, men's group on Wednesday,
Trustee's meeting on Thursday at the same time as choir practice, youth group on Friday and synod business on Saturday.
The University teacher has not just the young to teach, but department meetings, university committee meetings, manuscripts
149. Both Robert Gordon and Laura Kalman have cautioned me about this and the
following three paragraphs. They suggest that the contemporary American academic has
a far cushier existence than did the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century intellectual
dependent on patronage or the Nineteenth Century intellectual in academic employment. They may be right, though the travails of the European musician once aristocratic
patronage disappeared might suggest to the contrary, as does the decline of the servant
class and of unfettered spousal household labor among the middle class in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. These two matters aside, I ultimately stick to my
guns for two reasons. First, I believe that I have accurately described how life is experienced by the contemporary American academic intellectual. Second, if I am in fact
wrong, then the pattern of work in intellectual history is truly ridiculous. For a group of
historians to ignore the superior continuity of their current estate to that of times past

and instead to postulate as an ideal, a hero, the kantian intellectual independent of time
and place, is to expose an uncertainty about the value of the products of intellection that
even I hesitate to attribute to academics.
150. To see this phenomenon one could look in the cracks of STEVEN BIEL, INDEPENDENT INTELLEcTuALs IN THE UNrrED STATES (1992).
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to comment on for editors of learned journals or disciplinary
book series, thesis committees to serve on, graduate students
and new faculty to mentor and union affairs to attend to.
Nor is the infrastructure that made the life of the mind
easy, even in the early Twentieth Century, anywhere to be
found in the modern household. Servants are gone. Housekeepers are gone. Full-time homemakers are gone. In their place
have come scouts, ballet lessons, tennis lessons, after school
nights, little league practice, soccer practice, social science dioramas, trips to the library to get materials for school papers and,
let us not forget, quality time. Then there is the cooking, the
cleaning, the washing, the gardening and home repairs, the arguing about who doesn't do their share and the awful fact that
it takes two academic incomes to pay for a house and send the
kid to anywhere but old State U.151
Given these conditions, why we flagellate ourselves over
failing to measure up to the achievements of scholars in the late
Nineteenth and the first half of the Twentieth Century and so
constantly lament about how awful life in the University has become is beyond me. It would be more plausible for each of us to
put on our door a knock off from the old western sign-Don't
kill the intellectual, s/he is only trying-for the most extraordinary fact about the life of the mind in American is that under
these circumstances it exists at all! The details of the lives of intellectuals need to be celebrated, not suppressed. Less insecurity, less worry about the causative role of ideas in history and
more wonder that ideas have been produced at all is what is in
order.
Now what does any of this have to do with Duxbury's book?
In one sense, nothing, for on its terms it is a fine book. Indeed,
its method of presentation fits well with the discipline it wishes
to portray. Law has for its core ideology the notion that it is to
be understood on its own terms as a body of rules divorced from
the humans who make the rules-a government of laws not
men-and to be criticized in terms of its own understanding of
human life and values. Indeed, this ideology is so strong that
the whole of law and jurisprudence in America for the last, oh
say, 130 years could be rendered as a continuing struggle on the
part of a small group of dissenters from this view to make a lot
of noise in an attempt to draw attention to their dissents. Given
151. Less savory is the griping that is occasionally heard about how single individuals and individuals in a hetero or homosexual relationship without children have more
money to pay for household help and more time available for scholarship.
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this ideology and its fit with the methods of intellectual history
generally, Duxbury's book is unexceptionable.
In another sense however, because it too has its heroes off
stage, Patterns of American Jurisprudenceis missing much of
the story that should accompany and inform the jurisprudential
thought that it wishes to present. Surely it is of some significance that Coase experienced the growth of English socialism,
that Langdell was an appellate brief writer, that Frank was a
practicing lawyer with an over-active adrenal gland and that
Bickel was a Jewish immigrant taken under wing by another
Jewish immigrant. 152 Each of these individual's work, while
deeply intellectual, was also deeply personal. I know that mine
is. I have no doubt that I would have reacted quite differently to
law and thus have written quite differently had I not both
grown up and attended law school in Chicago and as a result
experienced the cognitive dissonance of finding myself being
taught that law was separate from politics in a town where
daily (and Daley) the papers were full of evidence of the inextricable admixture of the two. I similarly doubt that I would ever
have become involved in Critical Legal Studies had Robert
Gordon not known Duncan Kennedy and so seen to it that I attended the first CLS meeting. So, here are some things, but only
those things closely related to life in the law school, that I think
the next history of American jurisprudence should discuss when
it comes time to tell the story over again, this time in a way
that will make it more difficult to scramble the proper names.
There also have been enormous changes in law faculties
since 1870. There are more schools with more similarity among
them and simultaneously continuing, perhaps increasing, stratification. There are more students and I believe more diversity
among them, even among the white males. Still, most faculty do
less teaching than did the individuals who occupied their chairs
fifty years ago at the same time that everyone says that teaching feeds into scholarship. What has been the impact of all of
these changes on the lives of scholars and their scholarship? Of
scholars and scholarship on understanding these changes?
Simultaneously, there have been enormous changes in universities since 1870. They are larger and more diverse at the
same time that bureaucracy has made them both more subject
to centralized control and less amenable to detailed monitoring.
This has resulted in changes in, among other things, tenure
152. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Men of Great and Little Faith: Generationsof Constitutional Scholars, 30 BuFF. L. REv. 365 (1981).

326

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

standards, both with respect to teaching and scholarship. Have
any of these changes had any impact on scholars or scholarship
or vice versa?
Over the past fifty years there have been significant shifts
in the acceptability of social science scholarship of varying
kinds. As Duxbury makes clear, this is a direct consequence of
realism. Yet, most legal scholarship today can easily be described as normative, directed toward the justification, including
criticism, of norms, just as was the case in 1890, though there
has clearly been a shift in the pervasiveness of normative justification directed at the United States Supreme Court. What do
both these changes and these relative stases say about scholars
and their scholarship?
Since 1870 there has been a significant change in the size of
government at all levels and of the access of academics to all of
this government, especially at the Federal level. While only two
legal academics-John Henry Wigmore and William Reynolds
Vance-seem to have participated in national government during the First World War, starting with the New Deal, law
professors have increasingly participated in this growing apparatus of central control. Experience is supposed to make a difference in ones life and scholarship. Has this been the case?
One has the sense that the cohesiveness in groups that
comes from being separate and against the crowd makes for a
more stimulating intellectual environment. Langdell's Harvard,
Twenties Columbia, Thirties Yale, Fifties Harvard, Fifties and
Seventies Chicago, as well as Critical Legal Studies, a time with
no site, come to mind as potential examples. Could one find
other equally cohesive groupings where the intellectual product
is of negligible significance? If so, what made these groups stable and exciting, but nonetheless, their ideas not memorable?
Well, that's enough to start with, I suppose. Still, even answering all of these questions would not fully bring human actors to American jurisprudence. There would have to be some
juicy gossip as well. How about answering these questions, for
starters. Did Christopher Columbus Langdell really make a fortune in Western Massachusetts real estate mortgages and if so
where did all that money go? Was John Chipman Gray as isolated from his colleagues as his comments about Langdell would
indicate? Why was Wigmore on the outs with the Harvard
faculty? Why were Roscoe Pound's graduate students so devoted
to him? Was Wesley Hohfeld gay? Did Karl Llewellyn really cut
down on his drinking after Young B. Smith demanded an undated letter of resignation from him or did Smith just give up
caring? Who really knew Robert L. Hale and his work in 1932?
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Walton Hamilton and his work in 1928? What exactly were Lon
Fuller's politics? Henry Hart's? Why did Ronald Coase hate British socialism? Does Duncan Kennedy wear briefs or boxers?
Does Richard Posner ever sleep?

